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Executive Summary
Natural disasters have had a formidable impact on devel- identify the principal hazards it faces and assess the vul-
opment in Mexico. Disasters have destroyed human, social, nerability of principal settled areas, infrastructure, and
and physical capital, and they have derailed economic economic assets. The analysis should include esti-
development, as funds are reallocated from ongoing pro- mates of the direct, indirect, and secondary impacts of
grams to finance relief and reconstruction assistance. natural disasters.
The consequences for development and economic growth Mexico has highly competent intellectual and insti-
are ominous. tutional resources for hazard and vulnerability assess-
The aim of this study is to assess the current capac- ment at the National Center for Disaster Prevention
ity of Mexico to deal with disaster risk and to identify (CENAPRED) and the National Autonomous University
ways in which the impacts of catastrophes on the of Mexico. CENAPRED is a unique institution that
economy can be reduced. The study analyzes the three bridges the gap between academic researchers and the
main components of a comprehensive disaster risk man- government by channeling research applications devel-
agement strategy: risk identification, risk reduction, and oped by university researchers to the Ministry of the
risk transfer and financing. Interior. Neither CENAPRED nor the National
Mexico is vulnerable to a variety of natural disasters, Autonomous University receives the budgetary atten-
including earthquakes, hurricanes, and volcanoes. Despite tion it deserves, however.
the frequency with which these disasters strike, howev-
er, inadequate investment is made in mitigation efforts,
and insufficient funds are set aside to pay for relief and Risk Reduction
reconstruction efforts. As a result, when a disaster occurs,
the government is often forced to use funds that had been The damage caused by disasters can be reduced by
allocated to other programs, disrupting the operations changing perceptions and behavior so that all mem-
of those programs. The effect is to reduce growth and bers of society place a high priority on safety in plan-
derail important development efforts. ning and development. All stakeholders must contribute
The Mexican government could use mechanisms to to the creation of a culture of safety
manage risk so that ongoing programs are not disrupt- Civil defense in Mexico (as in many other countries)
ed following a disaster. Doing so involves identifying the has focused mainly on monitoring, preparedness, and
risks the country faces, mitigating the damage caused by response to disasters. These e fforts are crucial to miti-
those risks, and transferring the risk to other parties gating the effects of disasters. However, the core of a
(namely, insurance companies and the capital markets). mitigation program should consist of more "upstream"
measures, such as the safe lccation, design, and con-
struction of structures, infrastructure, and settlements.
Risk Identification Mexico has taken some important steps in this direc-
tion. Scientific advisory committees have been estab-
Formulation of an effective risk management strategy lished, standards for civil works have been set, engineering
must begin with the identification of risk. Mexico should advances have been made, schools have been retrofitted
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to withstand earthquakes, and a program for certifying part of the relief effort following a disaster could be
hospitals that meet disaster readiness standards has been used to implement mitigation measures, such as strength-
put into effect. Much more could be done, however, to ening buildings in earthquake- and wind-prone areas,
reduce vulnerability to disasters in the long term. The improving irrigation facilities in drought-prone areas,
government should develop strategies for- improving resettling communities away from hazardous sites, clear-
education about disaster mitigation, creating incentives, ing stream beds and drainage channels, constructing
and adopting regulations that will encourage individu- flood protection, and participating in reforestation.
als and businesses to reduce the risks they face and pro-
mote a culture of social protection.
Active programs of dissemination, targeted profes- Risk Transfer
sional education, and broad public education on disas-
ter risk and mitigation should be developed and delivered The Mexican property and casualty (or "general") insur-
throughout Mexico. Programs should include dissemi- ance market is underdeveloped, with the great major-
nation of information on natural hazard risk, mitigation, ity of property owners uninsured against maj or natural
and insurance (possibly through a collaborative effort catastrophes. The lack of property and casualty insur-
by the govemment and the insurance industry); the inclu- ance coverage in Mexico appears to be caused largely
sion of disaster preparedness and mitigation materials in by demand-side rather than supply-side factors. Although
elementary and high school curricula; and special pro- some factors distort the supply of property and casual-
grams to target low-income communities, which are often ty insurance in Mexico, excess catastrophic reinsurance
worst hit by disasters. capacity is available and a potentially large distribution
The regulatory approach to encouraging disaster mit- system has been developed.
igation in Mexico requires a comprehensive reassessment In order to increase insurance awareness and pene-
of the formal land use and building regulatory process- tration among small and medium-size enterprises and
es. New approaches to land use management and build- the general population, affordable insurance products
ing quality management must be developed that effectively must be available to the public. Capacity could be
contribute to public safety in the informal sector. In recog- increased and prices reduced in several ways:
nition of the fact that most mitigation decisions are * Catastrophic premium rates could be formally
made at the community level, resources must be allo- deregulated, with a maximum tariff set at the current
cated to increasing the capacity and authority for risk level.
management and disaster mitigation at the state and com- * The discontinued 10 percent compulsory surcharge
munity levels. on earthquake premiums could be reintroduced
New initiatives should also focus on positive incen- and extended to all catastrophe classes (including
tives, such as provision of community-level technical civil disturbances). These funds could be placed in
assistance for disaster mitigation, establishment of a central pool managed by the Mexican Insurance
"low-risk districts" or development of historic cen- Association, which would help stabilize reinsurance
ters that include tax incentives for those that invest in costs and cover catastrophe-induced insolvency Com-
mitigation, granting of financial assistance for engi- panies could continue to be required to accumulate
neering analysis of risk, and establishment of certifi- catastrophic reserves up to an agreed-upon stan-
cation programs. The private sector could consider dard retention level.
donating engineering design assistance or providing * This industry-run pool could be required to offer
it at low cost. catastrophe-only coverage, which would be distrib-
Disaster relief and recovery assistance, distributed uted by insurance companies.
through the government's Fund for Natural Disasters * In order to raise insurance awareness, the mandatory
(FONDEN) can also play an important role in post- automobile liability insurance requirement, which
disaster mitigation in areas in which disasters are recur- was postponed, could be implemented as soon as
rent. Temporary employment programs established as possible.
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. The insurance industry, in cooperation with the that have already been insured for noncatastrophic
government, could be encouraged to educate the risks. Limit agricultural coverage to farmers who are
public about insurance. unable to afford private insurance; farmers who are
* The government could consider providing targeted able to afford private insurance should be obligated
incentives to expand insurance density to purchase it. Subsume welfare payments to sub-
In addition, private sector insurance companies could sistence farmers under the victims fund or route them
be used to help Mexico deal more effectively with risk through other social safety net programs.
in the public sector. The public sector should purchase * Reconstitute FONDEN as a legal entity that is capa-
insurance through international brokers and risk ble of transferring risk.
transfer specialists; individual agencies should not be * Inventory all vital infrastructure and estimate
purchasing insurance on their own. More cost-effective FONDEN's risk exposure. Catastrophe modeling-
coverage should be purchased by increasing the which analyzes the frequency of hazard events, the
deductible level and purchasing higher levels of cata- severity of the events, the vulnerability of assets that
strophe coverage. are the responsibility of FONDEN, and the value
of those assets-could be used to make these
estimates.
The Role of FONDEN * Develop financial models that allow various policy
options to be evaluated. Financial modeling based on
Funds earmarked for relief and reconstruction after cat- the data developed in the catastrophe modeling
astrophe events in Mexico are maintained in FONDEN, would yield various options and prices for the trans-
which provides funds for the repair of uninsured infra- fer of risk.
structure, immediate assistance to restore the produc- * Group similar risks together in funds so they can be
tivity of subsistence farmers, and relief to low-income aggregated, priced, and transferred separately Allo-
victims of disasters. Budgetary allocations for FONDEN cate sufficient dedicated capital and premium-paying
have not been sufficient to cover the fund's obligations capacity to FONDEN to support its risk placements
since 1996, and shortfalls are made up by diverting in the insurance or capital. markets.
funds from other government budgets. The government * Modify FONDEN's mandate so that it is permitted to
could explore several innovative techniques to make disburse funds for studies and training on mitigating
more efficient use of the assets it allocates following dis- risk before a disaster occurs. Funding for studies and
asters. These include purchasing reinsurance, making training would represent an addition to the annual
use of new capital markets instruments, and using budgets of executing agerncies; the actual financing
contingent financing. of mitigation works would presumably be carried out
Before the government can make use of risk transfer as part of the public investment programs executed
and risk-financing tools, it must modify the way FONDEN by the various government departments.
is organized. Changes should include the following: * Consider linking the terms of FONDEN financing for
* Refocus FONDEN's efforts by absorbing only those reconstruction following a disaster to the extent to
residual catastrophic risks that cannot be absorbed which mitigation measures had been implemented
by third parties, encouraging economically worth- before the disaster (possibly through varying the cost-
while mitigation by the public sector, and fostering sharing arrangements with states and municipalities).
the development of private sector risk reduction * Establish guidelines to be followed by other gov-
and transfer mechanisms. ernment agencies in managing the risks they bear.
* Clearly define the risks for which FONDEN bears FONDEN could, for example, specify the types and
responsibility beginning with the infrastructure fund. acceptable limits for insurance coverage for various
Limit coverage to those infrastructure items that are types of infrastructure. It could also help federal,
essential to support the country's economic and social state, and local authorities purchase property insur-
affairs following a natural disaster and those items ance on a group basis.
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The Role of the World Bank providing contingent loans to finance a credit layer
in a risk management package.
The study has helped the World Bank define more clear- * Partial risk guarantees. The Bank operates a guaran-
ly ways in which it could help developing countries tee program that supports private investment in
manage disaster risk more effectively. Instruments that borrowing countries by guaranteeing against risks
could be of value include the following: associated with policy or contractual performance
* Loansfor investment in mitigation and reconstruction. by the government. Under the prograrr, the gov-
Loans could be provided to finance retrofitting plans ernment counterguarantees the Bank guarantee by
aimed at reducing losses (to schools, hospitals, pub- agreeing to repay the Bank for any payments it makes
lic buildings) and the reconstruction of infrastructure to investors under the terms of the guarantee. In prin-
damaged by natural disasters. An important feature ciple, this program might provide credit enhance-
could be to link the terms of reconstruction financing ment for catastrophe bonds and commercial
to the extent of mitigation carried out by the final contingent credit lines, thereby improving their terms
beneficiaries of the financing. A technical assistance and attractiveness to investors.
component could support capacity building for vari- In summary, there is much that Mexico can do, even
ous aspects of disaster management. in the short term, to improve its ability to reduce and
Contingent loans for reconstruction. To make sure that manage natural disaster risk. Leadership on lhazard and
funds are accessible immediately when disaster strikes, vulnerability assessment, mitigation research and diffu-
the Bank could establish a credit line that could be sion, insurance reform, and improved public sector
drawn upon under certain conditions. Establishing risk management programs are among the key actions
such a line would speed the delivery of funds during Mexico should take. This case study and future discus-
emergencies. sions with the Mexican government should help refine
* Contingent loansfor risk financing. Catastrophe risk these options so that they address Mexico's prmary con-
is normally "packaged" into "layers" and financed cerns and contribute to more sustainable social and
or transferred through a variety of arrangements, economic development.
including primary insurance, reinsurance, credit
financing, and bond and derivative financing.' Note
The combination of instruments used depends on 1. A "layer" constitutes a commitment to cover losses in excess
specific circumstances, including the relative costs of an agreed-upon minimum value and up to an agreed-upon
of the various instruments. The Bank could consider maximum value.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The World Bank established the Disaster Management natural disasters and because it is considering signif-
Facility in July 1998 to provide proactive leadership in icant public policy changes to its insurance regula-
coordinating efforts to introduce disaster prevention and tions. The mission to Mexico, carried out in October
mitigation practices in the range of development-related 1998 at the request of the Mexican government, found
activities. One of the facilitys key activities is the Market that Mexico can take steps to reduce natural disaster
Incentives for Mitigation Investment (MIMI) initiative. losses through mitigation and to finance losses more
MIMI seeks to create public-private partnerships to advance effectively when they do occur. This report synthesizes
disaster risk awareness and to provide effective incen- the findings of the October 1998 mission and incor-
tives for institutional and individual investment in disas- porates the comments and proceedings of a work-
termitigationmeasures. Theinitiative isimportantbecause shop held in Mexico City, February 23-24, 1999.
increasing World Bank and member country capacity to The specific objective of the study is to assess the
mitigate risks would save development resources and pro- current capacity of Mexico to deal with disaster risk
tect future investments. Privatization of disaster risk, where and to identify ways in which the impacts of catastro-
applicable, would allow governments to shift funding from phes on the economy can be reduced. The study ana-
emergency relief and reconstruction activities to more lyzes the three main components of a comprehensive
effective and sustainable disaster mitigation investment, disaster risk management strategy: risk identification,
Partnerships are key to the MIMI initiative. As the man- risk reduction, and risk transfer and financing.
ager of the MIMI initiative, the Disaster Management Chapter 2 examines risk identification, the first step
Facility has mobilized team members from vanous parts of comprehensive risk management. Risk identification
of the World Bank Group, including regional country is the process of assessing potential losses clue to nat-
departments, the Financial Sector Development Depart- ural disasters. Estimation of potential losses entails haz-
ment, and the International Finance Corporation. Team ard assessment andvulnerability assessment. The chapter
members also include academic institutions (Virginia includes recommendations for expansion and improve-
Polytechnic Institute and the International Institute for ment of natural disaster risk assessment in Mexico.
Applied Systems Analysis) and private sector insurers Chapter 3 examines risk reduction, which ir.cludes the
(the Aon Group, Gerling Global Reinsurance, Munich physical measures to reduce exposure or increase
Reinsurance, and Renaissance Reinsurance, Ltd.), resistance to natural hazards. Disaster mitigation mea-
which provide valuable expertise, information, and sup- sures are those that reduce the physical impacts of dis-
port to the team's research and policy development work. asters. The chapter describes current disaster mitigation
The linchpin of the MIMI initiative is its country case activities in Mexico and suggests ways in which the pub-
studies. These studies document current disaster expo- lic and private sectors can provide incentives for effec-
sure, insurance coverage, and the use of mitigation prac- tive risk reduction. Chapter 4 examines how Mexico
tices and assess the potential for mobilizing mitigation could transfer risk to the insurance industry It describes
investment through the insurance and financial markets. the role of insurance and reinsurance and explains
Mexico was chosen for the first appraisal mission why insurance coverage in Mexico is low. It proposes
because of its extensive experience with losses from a series of steps that could help Mexico use private insur-
6
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ance companies to improve the public sector's ability It also looks at the structure of FONDEN, making rec-
to deal with risk. Chapter 5 examines how Mexico might ommendations on ways the fund could be reorganized.
be able to use new financial instruments, such as cata- Chapter 6 summarizes the study's main findings and
strophe bonds and options to transfer or finance risk. recommendations.
I ,4 :'l
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Chaptei 2
Risk Identification: Assessing Hazards
and Vulnerability
In many countries, including Mexico, devastating Hazard and Vulnerability Assessment
natural disasters are a frequent occurrence. A natur-
al disaster occurs when an extreme event (flood, earth- The process of disaster risk management begins with
quake, drought) affects vulnerable structures, such risk identification. Risk identification includes hazard
as buildings and infrastructure, and the consequences assessment and vulnerability assessment. These activi-
surpass a society's ability to respond. Extreme nat- ties are essential for the definLtion of strategies to man-
ural events such as fires, floods, earthquakes, and age disaster risk, including risk reduction (mitigation
droughts, have always been part of the natural of the impact of disasters) and estimation of potential
cycle; virtually all parts of the world are exposed to losses necessary for financing or transferring risk. Haz-
them. ard assessment requires scientific understanding of
But accelerated changes in demographic and eco- relevant natural phenomena and interpretation of his-
nomic trends in Mexico, as in other countries, have torical records of the occurrence of extreme events.
disturbed the balance between ecosystems, increas- Hazard assessment provides the basis for the identi-
ing the risk of human suffering and death. Rapid pop- fication of hazard zones, which can be presented on
ulation growth increases pressures on natural resources maps at various scales. Such maps may indicate the
and the environment and raises the consequent risks expected peak intensity of an event (as is done on earth-
associated with human activities (Kreimer and Munas- quake zone maps) and the frequency of occurrence in
inghe 1991). Major disasters not only damage capi- a particular area (as is done on floodplain maps). See
tal assets but have long-term effects on the economy annex 1 for a map of some of the risks facing Mexico.
as well. Vulnerability assessment focuses on the targets of nat-
Despite the repeated experience of disasters, pub- ural hazards. It involves the evaluation of expected
lic officials often react with surprise at the results of performance of structures, infrastructure, and institu-
an "act of God." Awareness of risk to extreme natur- tions under the load exerted by extreme natural
al events is not well established in the process of events. Unreinforced masonry buildings, for example,
public and private investment decisionmaking. In- are known to perform poorly in particular types of earth-
adequate provision of disaster response and recon- quakes. Buildings with poorly secured roofs are known
struction funds before disasters often leads to ad hoc to suffer damage in hurricanes. More sophisticated dif-
fund transfers, disrupting and postponing planned ferentiation of expected performance is possible for a
development activities. Such diversion of develop- range of classes of structures and infrastructure.
ment funding postpones progress toward long-term When hazard assessment and vulnerability assess-
economic and social improvement. ment are combined, it is possible to develop estimates
While the precise scale, time, or location of disaster of potential losses. With established probabilities of nat-
events cannot be predicted, areas of hazard and vulnera- ural event occurrence and expected structural perfor-
bility can be identified. Aggregate losses can be antici- mance it is possible to attach estimates of probability
pated at the national level, and provision can be made for to specific loss scenarios. Modeling of expected disas-
extreme events. ter losses represents a valuable tool for public and private
9
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decisionmakers. Investors and insurance companies can and 1998 Mexico experienced 84 major earthquakes
evaluate the security of their investments and the extent (earthquakes measuring more than 7.0 on the Richter
of their exposure to disaster risk. Governments can use scale).
such models to plan for development, evaluate options To estimate the potential for catastrophic loss
for mitigation or risk reduction investments, and plan from earthquakes in Mexico, the country's seismici-
for response needs before a disaster occurs. ty needs to be analyzed in conjunction with patterns
The foundation of hazard assessment is the histori- of human and industrial habitation in disaster-prone
cal record of extreme events, including their location, areas. While significant research has focused on earth-
time, and intensity. The interpretation of this record in quake prediction, it is difficult to estimate earthquake
light of scientific understanding of the particular phe- frequency.
nomenon provides the basis for hazard mapping and Earthquakes occur frequently in Mexico because the
estimation of event frequency. country sits atop four tectonic plates, and movement
between the plates increases the risk of earthquakes. Epi-
centers of earthquakes stronger than 7.0 on the Richter
What Kind of Disasters Occur in Mexico? scale are located on the Pacific coast of the states of
Jalisco, Colima, MichoacTn, Guerrero, and Oaxaca. The
Mexico has a long history of natural disasters. Earthquakes most active seismic region in Mexico is the Guerrero
and floods figure prominently in Mexican tradition and coast, where scientists believe a major seismic event is
folklore. According to one legend, the modem age began long overdue. The Guerrero coast is a highly developed
after a powerful earthquake destroyed the area's original area, with a significant concentration of population, struc-
inhabitants, the Quinametin giants. Another legend claims tures, and infrastructure. The loss potential from a seis-
that Quetzalcbatl sent a hurricane to destroy the city of mic event in the region is thus very high.
Cholula. The major earthquakes of 1908, 1909, 1911, 1987,
Between 1980 and 1998 Mexico experienced 79 dis- and 1988 occurred in the northeast section of the "seis-
asters. These events included weather-related events (hur- mic gap." Most earthquake damage has occurred in
ricanes, storms, floods, droughts, and forest fires); the regions between Jalisco, Chiapas, and the Isth-
geology-related events (earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, mus of Tehantepac. Major earthquakes have also
and landslides); and events caused by human action (indus- occurred in Veracruz, Puebla, the State of Mexico,
trial accidents, chemical and oil spills and explosions, and and Baja California, especially near the border with
structural fires). More than half of the events were weath- the United States.
er related, with hurricanes and flooding as the leading The complexity of seismic events is illustrated by
causes of damage. the characteristics of the earthquake that struck
Much work has already been done in Mexico. Risk Mexico City in September 1985, an event that took
atlases, for example, identify vulnerable areas within more than 6000 lives and damaged the housing of
cities. Such tools can help policymakers develop effec- about 180,000 families. The ground movement res-
tive strategies for reducing or transferring risks in those onant cycle coincided with the natural vibration peri-
areas. No comprehensive analysis of vulnerability exists, od movement of the 5- to-12-story buildings that
however. Some sense of Mexico's vulnerability can be make up the city's dense historic center, making this
gained from examining the frequency and magnitude earthquake the most destructive in the hemisphere's
of various kinds of disasters. history Poorly built tenements housing low-income
families in overcrowded conditions suffered the worst
damage. Also affected were 340 office buildings, in
which 145,000 government workers were employed;
Mexico is a seismically active country It is located along 1,200 small industrial shops; 1,700 hotel rooms; 1,200
the world's "fire belt," where 80 percent of the earth's schools; and 2,000 hospital beds. The economic loss-
seismic and volcanic activity takes place. Between 1900 es exceeded $4 billion.
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Tropical Storms and Hurricanes Campeche portion of the Gulf of Mexico, the Eastern
Mexico is one of the countries most severely affected Caribbean, and the tropical Atlantic Ocean. The Gulf
by tropical storms. It is one of the few regions in the of Tehuantepec becomes turbulent around the end of
world that can be affected simultaneously by two inde- May Most hurricanes head out to sea, but some make
pendent cyclone regions, the North Atlantic and the landfall. The Sonda de Campeche portion of the Gulf
North Pacific. The frequency of hurricanes would jus- of Mexico becomes turbulent in June. Winds head
tify a well-organized system to deal with this hazard, north, affecting Veracruz and Tamaulipas. Hurricanes
something that is not in place (Rosengaus 1998). of great intensity occur in the Eastern Caribbean between
Between 1980 and 1998 Mexico suffered 43 weather- July and October, affecting Yucatan. The Atlantic Ocean
related disaster events. That period may have been between 80 and 120 latitude north becomes active in
atypical, however. During the 10 years between 1967 August. Winds head westward, penetrating the
and 1977, Mexico suffered 157 severe weather events, Caribbean Sea, YucatAn, Tamaulipas, and Veracruz.
including 57 hurricanes that caused serious damage in The precise location of these four regions is unstable
six states. Many parts of Mexico are affected by cyclones and can vary as a result of ocean currents and their
and tropical storms during the summer months (June temperatures.
to October). During the winter, nontropical storms can The states of Baja California Sur, Michoacan, Sinaloa,
lead to heavy rainfall in some parts of the country. Sonora, and Tamaulipas have been worst hit by hurri-
Other parts of the country are frequently affected by long canes, with hurricanes making landfall on average every
periods of drought, leading to the loss of cattle and crops. two to four years (map 2.1). About 40 percent of the
The hurricanes affecting Mexico come from four population, or some 4 million people, live along the
main regions: the Gulf of Tehuantepec, the Sonda de coast in these regions and are exposed to hurricanes.
Map 2.1 Path of Pacific Ocean hurricanes, August-November 1997
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Hurricanes can be devastating. In 1997 Hurricane volcanic ash is irritating to the lungs and, eyes, and
Pauline claimed hundreds of victims, caused flooding people are advised to take shelter until the air clears.
and landslides, and cut electricity, communications, and Falling ash can be dangerous for air traffic, which should
water. Acapulco, Mexico's most famous tourist desti- be suspended during volcanic eruptions. Ash can
nation, was badly hit when homes in squatter settle- damage motors, the moving parts of machines, and
ments on hillsides were destroyed, leaving many people infrastructure as well, blocking drains and causing elec-
homeless. Pauline had such devastating effects because tricity networks to short circuit. Excessive accumula-
it followed the coastline of Oaxaca and Guerreo, whip- tion of volcanic ash on rooftops can weaken structures.
ping up strong waves and currents. The region's uneven
topography also made it vulnerable to flooding and
landslides following the hurricane. Rapid urbanization
in coastal areas in recent years has increased the poten- Flooding caused by rivers overflowing their b anks occurs
tial damage that hurricanes like Pauline can cause to almost every year in Mexico. Heavy rainfall also causes
large population centers. erosion and landslides. Flooding is naturally less fre-
quent in semi-arid regions, but it can be particularly dev-
Volcanoes astating when it does occur there (as it did in Monterrey
in 1988, for example).
Mexico has dozens of volcanoes, 14 of which have erupt- Floods are rarely caused by heavy' rains alone. Soil
ed in recent history. Volcanic eruptions can produce ash- erosion caused by deforestation, inadequate agricultural
fall, tidal waves, lava and mud flows, and volcanic practices, and increasing urbanization all increase the risk
earthquakes. These phenomena vary from one volcano of flooding. Despite considerable investment in drainage
to another. infrastructure, Mexico City experiences losses every year
The most recent volcanic eruption that resulted in from flash flooding. The occurrence of flooding is increas-
catastrophic losses in Mexico was el Chichon in 1982, ing in flood plain areas that have been urbanizecd, as changes
which completely destroyed eight communities and in land use broaden the capture of rainfall, producing
claimed 2,000 lives. The eruption lasted nearly sixhours flows that the natural basin cannot cope with. Such
and caused $117 million worth of losses to crops, cat- urban flooding affects assets of considerable economic
tle, and damage to cultivable land within a 50-kilometer value.
radius (Gutierrez 1998). The loss from flooding in Mexico has been high.
Between 1993 and 1998 Popocatepetl, el Colima, el Between 1973 and 1990 more than 1,800 people died
Tacana, and el Everman were active, with all but el Ever- and about $7.7 billion in economic losses were incurred
man threatening settled areas. A major eruption of (Gutierrez 1998).
Popocatepetl would affect settlements within a 20-30
kilometer radius, according to researchers at the Nation-
al Autonomous University of Mexico. The volcano is being Forest Fires
carefully monitored to allow for preparedness measures, Mexico experiences forest fires every year. The magnitude
including evacuation of the communities in the vulner- of these fires depends in part on climatic conditions. In
able area. 1998, for instance, excessively dry conditions, strong
In major cities-such as Puebla, Cuernavaca, and winds, and high temperatures resulting from the El Nifno
Mexico City, where the closest volcano is 43 kilo- phenomenon increased the number and severity of for-
meters away-the effects of a volcanic eruption are like- est fires. Damage from forest fires was particularly severe
ly to be limited to falling volcanic ash. Falling ash lasting in 1998, when about 850,000 hectares, includ-ng 198,000
for many hours can darken the sky and lead to electri- of forested land, were destroyed (table 2.1). WVorst affect-
cal storms that can interfere with telecommunications. ed were the states of Chihuahua, Oaxaca, and Durango.
Day suddenly turning to night can also have negative Slash and burn agriculture was responsible for more
psychological effects upon inhabitants. While not toxic, than half of all forest fires in Mexico in 1998, according
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Table 2.1 Forest fires in Mexico, 1993-98 Directorate of Civil Protection of the Ministry of the Inte-
1ear Number ofnres Hectacrcs affctctd rior represents a major contribution to natural hazards
1993 10,251 235,020 data collection and analysis. CENAPRED was established
1904 7,830 141,502 with financial and technical assistance from the Japan-
1995 7,860 309,097 ese government. It is located on the campus of the Nation-
1996 95216 2481765 al Autonomous University of M\exico and benefits from
1998 14,445 849.632 close cooperation with the university
Sotrce. Ministrv of Environment, Natural Resources, and Fisheries 1998 CENAPRED is a unique institution that bridges the
gap between academic researchers and the govern-
to the Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources and ment by channeling research applications developed by
Fisheries. Natural causes accounted for only 3 percent university researchers to the Ministry of the Interior. It
of all forest fires. is involved in both research and information dissemi-
nation. Its collaboration with academic researchers
and practical application of scientific knowledge rep-
How are Hazards and Vulnerability Assessed resent a model that could be adopted by other disaster-
in Mexico? prone countries.
Risk identification is composed of hazard assessment and
vulnerability assessment. Vulnerability is generally a How Do Natural Disasters Affect Economic
function of location or construction. Assessing vulnera- Development?
bility compares the resistive capacity or strength of a
structure to the expected natural hazard loads associated An important component of vulnerability assessment is
with the structure's location. Buildings and infrastructure the analysis of disaster damage in order to determine the
are classified by structural type and material. Based on resistive capacity or strength of a structure to the
laboratory tests and actual disaster damage experience, impacts of a particular natural hazard. Understanding the
engineers are able to estimate the expected performance full economic impacts of natural disasters is also essen-
of structures subjected to such factors as ground shaking tial to developing disaster risk management policy
intensityorwindspeed. Surveyandevaluationofthestock Over the past 25 years, a growing body of research
of buildings and infrastructure can provide estimates of has analyzed the economic impacts of disasters in
potential damage and can help to identify weaknesses in developing countries (Benson 1997; Benson and
criticalstructuresorsystems. The vulnerabilityassessment Clay 1998). The United Nations Economic Council
provides the basis for risk reduction activities. Once vul- for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has car-
nerable structures and infrastructure are identified, strate- ried out systematic studies of the short- and long-term
gies can be developed to strengthen or replace them. economic consequences of disasters. ECLAC's method-
Mexico is fortunate to have highly competent intel- ology distinguishes three types of losses: direct loss-
lectual and institutional resources for hazard and vul- es, indirect losses, and secondary effects. While some
nerability assessment. For hurricane, flood, coastal work has been done in Mexico on direct losses, very
flooding, and drought, hazard assessment is carried out little information is available on indirect and secondary
by the National Water Commission. For earthquake, losses.
volcano, and landslide hazards, assessment is handled
by the National Center for Disaster Prevention
(CENAPRED) and units of the National Autonomous Direct and Indirect Losses
University of Mexico. Direct losses include losses of physical assets owned
Following the 1985 Mexico City earthquake signifi- by individuals, businesses, and the government. They
cant progress was made in identifying natural disaster include damage to structures and infrastructure as well
risk. The establishment of CENAPRED in the General as loss of inventory and agricultural produce.
14 Managing DisaLster Risk in Mexico: Market Incentivesfor Mlitigation Investment
Indirect losses are losses caused by the disruption of 1. Ad hoc reallocation of expenditurefollowing a disas-
resource allocation across sectors and within markets. ter can jeopardize long-term development goals. Emer-
These losses include the forgone production of goods gency reconstruction requirements in the immediate
and services as a result of interruptions in utility ser- aftermath of a natural disaster often demand a sub-
vices, transport, labor supply, suppliers, or markets. Indi- stantial reallocation of resources and government expen-
rect losses also include the cost of providing interim diture in the short run. In Mexico funds that had been
services while the original operating capacity is being committed to other programs have been reallocated to
restored. provide disaster assistance. Funds supported by World
Most estimates of disaster loss in Mexico have exam- Bank lending have also been diverted to deal with emer-
ined onlythe direct losses oflife and property (table2.2). gency needs. As much as 30 percent of WoVorld
While direct damage is an important measure of Bank-financed funds earmarked for water sector pro-
impact, it does not capture the full impact of the event jects in Mexico, for example, are believed to have
on the economy been reallocated to disaster-related programs. Even if
funds are well spent on disaster-related operations, a
sudden unplanned reallocation can undernine, if not
Secondary Economic Effects
sacrifice altogether, the longer-term development objec-
Secondary effects include impacts on such macroeco- tive of the project that was bled of its resources. In agri-
nomic variables as economic growth, the balance of culture, for instance, production targets may not be
payments, public spending, and inflation. Estimating met. Indivisible infrastructure projects-such as power
these costs is difficult because of data limitations.' These plants, highways, and ports-may not be built at all.
effects can hurt long-term economic development in Failure to fund these projects reduces economnic growth.
several ways: 2. The need to respond to natural disasters may under-
minefinancial planning and budgeting as an instrument of
Table 2.2 Annual deaths and direct economic losses economic and social development. In countries prone to
caused by disasters in Mexico, 1980-98 natural disasters, ad hoc reassignment of government
Direct economic !osses funds inevitably becomes frequent, if not routine, unless
Yea Deathls (milior,s of u.s dollars) efforts are made to mitigate the effects of such disas-
1980 3 310.4 ters. If budgetary allocations are regularly pillaged to
1982 50 314.0 deal with natural disasters, confidence in the govern-
1984' 1.000 26.3 ment's commitment to loncg-term economic and social
l985 6,043 4,159.91 D
1986 0 1.5 development and its ability to pursue such goals will
1987 6 0.3 be undermined. Unpredictable budget commitments
1988 692 2,092.9 are also likely to undermine efforts by state and munic-
1989 0 648.0
1990 391 94 5ipal governments that contribute to long-term economic
1991 11 167.5 development. Disasters are normal events in Mexico,
1992 276 192.5 occurring an average of three times a year between 1980
1993 28 125.6 and 1998. The government thus needs to take these
19954 364 6896 events into account in its development planning. Dis-
1996 224 5.3 aster mitigation and risk transfer measures can help
1997 228 447.8 the government restore the sustainability of its sup-
1998 199 2,478.8 port-through the budget-for economic and social
Total 9515 11, 758.7 development.
Note: Figures for 1981 and 1983 were not available. Figures are based on
data available on particular events and do not represent a comprehensive 3. Expenditures on disaster recovery can cause budget
economic assessment of all direct losses. Figures in U.S. dollars are based deficits. Reallocation of budgetary assignments to disaster-
on conversion rates in the vear the losses were incurred. r r
* ~~~~~~~~relatedl reconstruction may not be enough to meet all
a. Includes $515 million in indirect losses.
Soturce: Bitran Bitran 1999. emergency needs; additional funds may be needed to
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meet the needs of people affected by the crisis. The dif- Recommendations
ficulty of funding such needs may be exacerbated by
the fact that public sector revenues may be interrupt- Before it can develop an effective risk management strat-
ed by the disaster. Pressures to meet such needs can egy, Mexico must identify the principal hazards it
thus increase public sector deficits, possibly driving up faces and assess the vulnerability to those hazards of
interest rates and the rate of inflation. Such deficits its major settled areas, its infrastructure, and its eco-
undermine international investors' confidence in the nomic assets. A good starting place would be a com-
continuity of government policy, reducing both domes- plete inventory of federal government assets. The risk
tic and foreign investment. Measures to mitigate the assessment should include estimates of direct, indirect,
effects of natural disasters can help attenuate such effects. and secondary losses from disasters in order to provide
4. Natural disasters can adversely affect the balance of a better understanding of the most appropriate policy
payments. Natural disasters are likely to hurt a coun- options.
try's balance of payments, particularly if the area hit is Efforts already under way at CENAPRED and the
a major exporting region. Developing models that clas- National Autonomous University of Mexico should receive
sify regions in terms of their effects on the balance of additional support so that these institutions can con-
payments could help governments pinpoint where dis- tinue to operate as centers of excellence in natural haz-
aster mitigation efforts could be most beneficial in terms ard research. The valuable role CENAPRED plays in
of preventing deterioration of the trade deficit.2 identifying earthquake and volcano hazards should be
5. Investors are likely to demand higher rates of return expanded to include the other principal hazards affect-
following a disaster to compensate them for higher per- ing Mexico.
ceived risks. Changes in the perception of risk can adverse-
ly affect an economy if investors demand higher rates of Notes
return. Entrepreneurs who do not believe they are 1. Given the enormous size of Mvlexico's economy-GDP was
being adequately compensated for the risk they face may $335 billion in 1997-most studies have been unable to detect
decide to close their businesses or move to a less risky the effects of disasters on macroeconomic variables. The sole
location. If a business closes, the national economy suf- exception is the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, which adverse-
fers a loss of income; if a business relocates within the ly affected macroeconomic variables in 1986.
country, income is merely transferred from one region 2. Some attempts have been made to estimate the effect of nat-
to another. Both cases have negative impacts on the local ural disasters in Mexico on the balance of payments. According
economy and could serve as an inducement for local to one estimate, the 1985 earthquake m Mexico City increased
governments at the state and municipal level to take mea- Mexico's balance of payments defcit by S8.6 billion in the five
sures to mitigate the effects of natural disasters. years following the quake (Jovel undated).

Chapter 3
Mitigating Damage by Reducing
the Level of Risk
Natural disasters result when an extreme natural event or irrigation systems. Resistance seeks to reduce the
coincides with a vulnerable human settlement. Put sim- damage caused by hazards by constructing settlements
ply, disasters are a product of hazard and vulnerability: that can withstand their effects. Both strategies are essen-
tial to reducing disaster risk. Avoidance strategies should
Disaster = hazard x vulnerability be used in land use and development planning. Resis-
tance strategies should be used in building safe struc-
The risk of disaster can be reduced by reducing either tures.
the hazard factor or the vulnerability factor (or both). The first priority in natural disaster vulnerability
In the case of some hazards, such as floods and land- reduction must be to ensure that new structures, infra-
slides, engineering technologies can reduce the effect structure, and settlements are structurally sound and
of a hazard. For other hazards, such as earthquakes located in areas that are not vulnerable to hazards. Doing
and hurricanes, no effective means are available to mod- so will require clear delineation of hazard zones and
ify the intensity, frequency, or location of a hazard event. the establishment of constnrction standards that cor-
In the short term, real time hazard monitoring can pro- respond to expected hazard exposure. More problem-
vide useful information that can help communities atic are existing structures, which may be difficult to
prepare for disasters, mobilize resources, and evacuate relocate and expensive or impossible to reinforce.
populations. Such monitoring can reduce deaths caused The estimation of potential disaster losses provides a
by flooding, hurricanes, and volcanoes. useful reference for evaluating the cost and benefits of
Civil defense in Mexico (as in many other countries) mitigation expenditures. Building codes, for example,
has focused mainly on monitoring, preparedness, and can be analyzed to compare the added costs of con-
response to disasters. While effective preparedness struction, supervision, and regulation with the poten-
and response strategies are crucial to mitigating the tial savings from reducing the expected damage from
effects of disasters, the core of a mitigation program future extreme events.
should be more "upstream' measures, such as the safe
location, design, and construction of structures, infra-
structure, and settlements. Coordinating Risk Mitigation Efforts
throughout the Country
Developing a Risk Reduction Strategy The Mexican government established the National Civil
Protection System (SINAPROC) in 1986 as the main
The most important means of reducing disaster risk is mechanism for interagency coordination of disaster
reducing vulnerability Two basic strategies are used: efforts. SINAPROC is responsible for mitigating the loss
avoidance and resistance. Avoidance seeks to reduce of lives and material and the interruption of essential
the effects of hazards on settlements by banning society functions caused by disasters. Responsibility for
building in hazard zones or modifying the pattern of the system lies with the General Coordinating Body for
occurrence of the hazard with structures such as dams Civil Protection in the Ministry of the Interior. The
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system synchronizes the technical work of various min- SINAPROCs Program for Civil Protection 1995-2000
istries (table 3.1). is set up as a national regulatory and operational instru-
In 1990 the National Council for Civil Protection (Con- ment. The program defines the prevention anc response
sejo Nacional de Protecci6n Civil) was added to SINAPROC. actions required to deal with natural disasters. It also
The council is an advisory, planning, and coordinating defines the authority, responsibilities, and relationships
committee for civil protection. It is headed by the Presi- among different offices and organizations. The program
dent of Mexico and made up of 12 ministers and the mayor covers prevention, rescue, and recovery
of the federal district of Mexico City SINAPROC issues public wamings based on- the level
At the subnational levels, governors of states and of emergency response required (table 3.2). It then
presidents of municipalities are responsible for imple- coordinates responses by different ministries (table 3.3).
menting and coordinating local Civil Protection Sys- Once an emergency is over, responsibility for recon-
tems. These State and Municipal Councils for Civil struction reverts to the ministry responsible for the sec-
Protection are responsible for planning, prevention, tor affected.
and implementation of recovery actions after natur- To help prepare for and mitigate the effects of dif-
al disasters. These offices provide requested support ferent kinds of potential disasters, SINAPRCC has set
to state and municipal governments. Each state and up mechanisms for monitoring disasters. Th-is moni-
municipal council also has its own technical unit for toring, which covers earthquakes, cyclones, and volca-
civil defense. The autonomy of these subnational coun- noes, is performed by various institutions:
cils sometimes conflicts with the effective integra- Earthquakes. The National Broad Band Seismology
tion and coordination of national efforts by SINAPROC. Network was designed by the Engineering Institute
of the National Autonomous University of Mexico
Table 3.1 Responsibility for technical support to monitor earthquake activity in Mexico. A new
to SINAPROC network has also been developed to improve the
Iype oft !IaZad Tecd.hnical oordiiator understanding of the earthquake hazard in Mexico.
G(eologic Ministry of Social Development Cyclones. Working with regional hurricane centers
Hvdro-me:eorolog cal Ministry of Environmental, in Miami and San Francisco, Mexican authorities
Natural Resources, and analyze tropical cyclones in order to help forecast
Fisheries the movement and intensity of hurricanes head-
CheLnical Ministry of Trade and Industrial ing toward Mexico. These forecasts are made avail-
Development able to the Ministry of the Interior's Civil Defense
Healtli Ministry of Environmental, Directorate and state representatives of tlle (nation-
Natural Resources, and al) Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources.
Fisheries
Mexico also monitors tropical cyclones, through
Sociat-o7--anzational Ministry of the Inter-ior
-- cihaa Ministy of he Ineriorits own information network. Between May and
Source: Ministry of the Interior.
Table 3.2 Actions taken during various states of emergency
Err,ergc,Cv sate Definitior, Action
Pre-warning Occurrence of catastrophic phenomenon possible. Prevention actions taken by local authorities.
\\'arning Occurrence of catastrophic phenomenon imminent- Preparedness program readied for search and rescue.
Alarm Catastrophic phenomenon produces damage. Local emergency declared and emergency program
executed.
Emergency Health and security risk exceeds state capacity to State of emergency declared and emergency program
respond executed.
Disaster More than one state suffers severe damage affecting President declares disaster.
social structure and vital systems. Federal response measures required.
Source: SINAPROC.
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Table 3.3 Emergency actions and technical coordinators What Steps Have Been Taken to Mitigate Risk?
Action Tcckitvol coordirnator
Warning Ministry of the lnter.or Important steps have already been taken in Mexico to
Damainge asessmnt Ministry of the Interior mitigate disaster risk. Scientific advisory committees
Darnage assessment Ministry of the Interior
(CENAPRED) have been established, standards for civil works have
Emergency plans Ministry of the Inteior been set, engineering advances have been made, schools
(National Center of Operations) have been retrofitted to withstand earthquakes, and a
Emergencv coordination Ministry of the Intenor program for certifying hospitals that meet disaster readi-
(National Center of Operations) ness standards has been put into effect.
Security Ministry of the Interior
Search and rescue Ministry of National Defense Scientific Advisory Committees
Logistical support Ministry of the Interior In response to the active state of the Popocatepetl vol-
Health Ministry of Health cano since December 1994, CENAPRED set up scientif-
Provisions Ministry of Trade and Industrial ic advisory committees to aid the monitoring and
Development decisionmaking process. Four committees, each made
Emergency communications Ministry of the Interior up of unpaid experts in the appropriate field, were
Source: Ministry of the Interior. established to study geology-related events, weather-relat-
ed events, chemical-related events, and the social impli-
November, observation and related telecommuni- cations of an eruption of Popocatepetl. Each of these
cations networks constantly monitor weather sys- committees has contributed to the mitigation effort in
tems, providing updated satellite imagery every 30 Mexico:
minutes. Bulletins and warnings of tropical cyclones . The scientific advisory committee on geology-relat-
are passed on to the Ministry of the Interior's Civil ed events has four functions. It strengthens efforts
Defense Directorate three times a day, allowing civil to enhance the safety of dikes securing water reser-
defense directors to alert civil defense units in at- voirs, undertakes the necessary studies and moni-
risk zones. toring of Mexico's active volcanoes, promotes and
Volcanoes. Four volcanoes are currently being mon- coordinates the updating of local building regula-
itored in Mexico. CENAPRED and the National tions and their enforcemen-it, and supports detection,
Autonomous University of Mexico monitor monitoring, and warning systems for tsunamis in
Popocatepetl; the University of Colima monitors Col- Mexico.
ima; the governments of Mexico and Guatemala mon- . The scientific advisory committee on weather-relat-
itor Tacana ; and CENAPRED and Vera Cruz University ed events provides information on weather condi-
monitor Pico de Orizaba. Emergency response pro- tions and forecasts, especially information relating
grams have been designed for dealing with eruptions to tropical storms and hurricanes; assesses the vul-
of Popocatepetl and Colima. nerability of bridges to being swept away by floods;
SINAPROC provides a structure for coordinating and calibrates and uses meteorological radar in
emergency preparedness and response activities at the Mexico. It analyzed the government's performance
federal and subnational levels. Long-term disaster risk before and during Hurricane Pauline.
reduction, however, requires the mobilization of dif- . The scientific advisory committee on chemical-related
ferent institutions and skills from those appropriate for events monitors the processing and transportation
emergency response. Long-term mitigation must be of dangerous substances, forest fire management, com-
incorporated into strategies for sustainable development mand systems and transport and distribution of
and tested against overall social and economic goals. toxic waste; assesses the vulnerability of communi-
Efforts for longer-term risk reduction in Mexico are ties to industrial accidents; and fosters mutual industrial
discussed below. help groups.
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The scientific advisory committee on social sciences sity faculty have worked with the Mexican Society for
has undertaken studies on the social problems faced Earthquake Engineering to bring up-to-date training to
by communities at risk from an eruption of Popocatepetl practicing engineers in other parts of Mexico.
and created a council made up of chairpersons of the The Pan-American Health Organization has created
scientific advisory committees. a program of voluntary certification of disaster readi-
ness for health facilities interested in preparing for and
mitigating the effects of disasters-a concept that
B °dding and Readiness Standards could be extended to other types of institutions, such
The Federal Electricity Commission has played an impor- as schools, government agencies, municipal govern-
tant role in natural hazard mitigation in Mexico by ments, and private companies. The prograrr. provides
developing the Manual of Civil Works. This 10-volume guidance on appropriate measures and certrfies com-
work includes current engineering standards for pliance with those measures based on expert evaluation
earthquake-, wind-, and flood-resistant designs. The of structural safety, provision for functionality follow-
manual serves as a voluntary reference standard for design ing a disaster, programs for mass care, special staff train-
engineers in all parts of Mexico that lack modern and ing, and organizational and administrative orientation.
complete design standards. Regrettably, the research team Certification enhances an institution's reputation and
that has updated the manual has been disbanded because indicates its level of disaster preparedness. Despite the
of budget constraints, and the future of this critical ref- benefits of certification, however, less than 5 percent of
erence is uncertain. hospitals have undergone the process.
Thanks to studies of the seismic risks facing Mexico
City and seismic engineering instruments that have been
installed, much is now known about the characteris- Urban in as
tics of ground motion during earthquakes. Current
building regulations in Mexico take into account sub- Mexico's urban areas are home to 74 percent of the coun-
soil types in different parts of the Mexico Valley to deter- try's population. Rapid and uncontrolled growth of the
mine the kind, size, and use of construction allowed. major cities has increased the vulnerability of their inhab-
Mexico City's construction norms are now very strict, itants-especially those with low incomes-to the effects
resulting in much safer buildings than those built before of disasters. A recent example was Hurricane Pauline,
1985. Programs for retrofitting and reinforcing dam- which caused great human losses, not through high
aged buildings with weak structures have been devel- winds or tidal surges but through extraordinarily high
oped, with priority given to hospitals and schools. rainfall, which led to runoff down steep slopes of moun-
All school buildings in seismic areas of Mexico were tain sides that had been settled illegally
retrofitted to comply with the Manual of Civil Works in Mexico's National Plan of Urban Development
1989. The project was initiated and managed by Daniel (1995-2000) details the country's policy for the sector.
Ruiz, the former director of the Earthquake Engineer- The plan makes proposals concerning the location of
ing Institute of the National Autonomous University of population and economic activity at the national and
Mexico and current director of the National Water Com- subnational levels taking into consideration the historic
mission. The effort represented an extension of the pro- formation of human settlements in Mexico, the inter-
gram financed by the 1986 World Bank Emergency nal organization of population centers with regard to
Reconstruction Loan, which financed the strengthen- land use, and the basic infrastructure requirements of
ing of schools in Mexico City. All school buildings in the population.
Mexico are now insured by the federal government. Land management policy at the national level ties the
The Earthquake Engineering Institute of the Nation- objectives of settlement policy to those of urban devel-
al Autonomous University of Mexico has played a par- opment. This is done in a framework of coordination
ticularly important role in the revision of seismic design that aims to promote local economic activities, gener-
standards following the 1985 earthquake. The univer- ate employment, improve living conditions, and increase
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equity in public sector management. The National subsidies for mitigation. Private sector incentives could
Plan of Urban Development (1995-2000) incorpo- include reduced insurance premiums or reduced inter-
rates strategies in four areas: est rates on construction loans.
* Urban development of 100 cities
* Consolidation of large metropolitan cities
* Land use planning and support of urban development duc
* Promotion of participation of all stakeholders in urban The educational approach to changing attitudes is based
development by establishing consultative councils at on knowledge. Knowledge about natural hazards, vul-
all levels and providing technical assistance to these nerability, and mitigation is based on scientific and engi-
councils neering research. Continued strong funding for the
Urban design is an essential tool of disaster mitiga- high-quality research on natural disaster risk reduc-
tion. Planning, land use management, and building reg- tion conducted at such institutions as the National
ulations by themselves can make an enormous Autonomous University of Mexico and CENAPRED is
contribution to mitigating the worst effects of natural critical to the success of the educational approach.
and other disasters. In practice, however, the imple- Dr. Roberto Meli, director general of CENAPRED,
mentation and impact of these regulations has been lim- has highlighted four main research areas that can con-
ited. Disaster risk management should be integrated tribute to mitigation efforts:
into urban planning to ensure the safety of human set- * Evaluation of the management of recent Mexican disasters.
tlements and their infrastructure. Recent disasters can provide valuable lessons on improv-
ing disaster prevention and mitigation strategies. Inves-
tigation of contributing factors, damage evaluation, and
Recommendations emergency management and recovery measures in three
recent disasters-Hurricane Pauline (1997), the 1998
Disaster risk can be reduced if high priority is placed Chiapas rain storms, and the 1998 forest fire season-
on safety in all planning and development. Doing so could prove particularly instructive.
requires a change in attitudes and behaviors, however. Modernization of building codes and quality verification
Three approaches can help effect such change: programs. Building codes in Mexico need to be updat-
• Education. Accurate, understandable information on ed. They also need to be made more uniform and
disaster risk and mitigation measures must be pro- enforced throughout the country. Model codes should
vided to key decisionmakers and to the public at be developed that correspond to local hazard risks
large. and construction practices. Mechanisms to ensure
* Regulation. Those who disregard public safety should code enforcement should also be studied.
be restrained in the public interest. Permission to build *Methodologies for local community risk management
in known hazard zones should be denied, and safe studies. Sound disaster mitigation programs can be
construction should be required by law Local gov- prepared and implemernted only on the basis of
ernments, which regulate urban planning and land detailed risk studies in which local physical and social
use, must ensure that hazardous sites are not occu- conditions are taken into account to build alterna-
pied by punishing violators who put public safety at tive damage scenarios. Such studies should use a
risk. Structures built in contravention of the law, includ- common methodology leading to the development
ing structures in hazard zones and structures that do of mitigation measures and emergency management
not meet safety standards, should be demolished. programs tailored to local communities. A pilot "micro-
* Incentives. Individuals and corporations that engage zonation" study could be performed to demonstrate
in appropriate behavior (choosing safe locations and the proposed methodology
constructing safe facilities) should be rewarded. Where * Formulation of megadisaster scenarios. The occur-
economicallyjustified, public sector incentives could rence of a rare unanticipated natural disaster could
include fiscal measures, such as tax credits or direct produce much more severe losses than those covered
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by Mexico's disaster relief fund. To establish insur- igation are not available in many parts of the coun-
ance coverage needs and prepare mitigation strate- try Lack of training in seismic, wind, and hiydrolog-
gies, it is necessary to estimate the maximum ic design means that many practicing engineers have
losses that could be incurred given the occurrence only a limited understanding of special design pro-
of various events with different probabilities of tran- visions. The Mexican Society for Earthquake Engi-
spiring. Some possible megadisasters include a neering has worked to promote education about
Mitch-like hurricane hitting the Yucatan Peninsu- earthquakes in some parts of the country Training
la and the Mexican Gulf Coast, damaging the on mitigation must be provided throughout bhe coun-
Campeche offshore oil fields, the Tabasco-Ver- try, and it must cover all potential disasters. Provid-
acruz petrochemicals facilities, and highly popu- ing this training will necessitate additional funding
lated areas; an 8.2 Richter magnitude earthquake for CENAPRED and the National Autonorr.ous Uni-
in the Guerrero gap, damaging Acapulco and Mex- versity of Mexico.
ico City; and a Plinian eruption of the Popocatepetl
volcano, with large pyroclastic flows destroying Regulation
nearby inhabitated areas and heavy ashfalls cover-
ing a radius of 80 kilometers from the crater (includ- The traditional approach to natural hazard mitigation is
ing much of Mexico City). coercive regulation. Building codes and zoning laws are
Convincing the public of the importance of taking promulgated by public agencies and enforced through
action to mitigate natural disasters is difficult, because the legal system, writh varying degrees of effectiveness.
most people are unaware of the level of risk they face There is no provision for choice of risk exposure by
and are unwilling to invest in programs that may yield individuals.
benefits only in the long run. Information and educa- This approach is feasible if there is an organized
tion are key to overcoming these barriers. Active pro- and effective plan review and field inspection process
grams of dissemination, targeted professional education, and if the population accepts the rationale of the reg-
and broad public education on disaster risk and mitiga- ulation and is able and willing to pay the costs of
tion should be developed and delivered throughout Mex- enforcing it. Where these conditions are not met, the
ico. These efforts should include a broad program of effectiveness of the regulatory approach may be
public information on natural hazard risks, risk mitiga- reduced.
tion, and insurance, undertaken as a collaborative effort In Mexico, as in many other countries, regulation
by the government and the insurance industry. The objec- and enforcement are not applied uniformly To improve
tive of this program should be to create a 'culture of the effectiveness of this approach, policymakers should
safety" conduct a comprehensive reassessment of regulations
Including disaster preparedness and mitigation in governing land use and building construction. At the
elementary and high school curricula is also recom- same time, new approaches to land use and building
mended. Helping to develop a culture of safety among quality management should be developed that effec-
young children would provide long-term benefits. tively contribute to public safety Recognizing that most
Special efforts should also be made to educate low- mitigation decisions are made at the community level,
income communities, which are typically the most resources must be allocated to increase capacity and
vulnerable to disasters, on disaster mitigation. authority for risk management and disaster initigation
Mexico has made substantial progress in mitigat- at the state and community levels.
ing disaster risks since its 1985 earthquake, thanks
in part to the world-class experts at CENAPRED and
the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Efforts
have not been uniform throughout the country, The incentive approach involves both public and pri-
however. Specialized training in earthquake engi- vate sector incentives for engaging in behavior that
neering and other specialties related to disaster mit- reduces risk. The public sector could encourage desir-
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able behavior by providing community-level technical The Role of the Fund for Natural Disasters
assistance for disaster mitigation, establishing low-risk (FONDEN)
districts that include tax incentives for mitigation invest-
ment, providing financial assistance for engineering The Mexican government allocates budgetary funds
analyses of risk, and establishing certification programs, for disaster relief and reconstruction efforts by placing
such as the Pan-American Health Organization program them in the Fund for Natural Disasters (FONDEN).
for health facilities described above. FONDEN is not currently permitted to use its funds
The private sector could also encourage risk mitiga- for pre-disaster mitigation purposes. It can, however,
tion. Engineering firms could donate design assistance allocate funds to postdisaster mitigation efforts in areas
or provide such assistance at low cost. Most important, where disasters are recurrent. Such postdisaster miti-
insurance companies could play a much larger role than gation could help break the cycle in disaster-prone areas.
they currently do in Mexico. Following a disaster, FONDEN could help mitigate
In industrial countries the insurance industry is one future disasters by providing grant funds worth 5-10
of the primary sources of information and expertise on percent of the relief allocatior. to be used for approved
dealing with risk. Households and businesses covered mitigation projects in impacted areas or states. Tempo-
by insurance enjoy greater security both because they rary employment programs, which are generally part of
adopt risk reduction measures and because they trans- the relief effort, could be structured to implement miti-
fer the risk to the insurer (and are therefore ensured that gation measures. Temporary workers could help strength-
their losses will be replaced). Insurance coverage would en buildings in earthquake- and wind-prone areas, improve
thus be of great value to people in disaster-prone irrigation facilities in drought-prone areas, resettle com-
developing countries, where most of the population munities away from hazardous sites, clear stream beds
lacks reliable information on the risks to which they and drainage channels, construct flood protection, and
are exposed and knowledge of effective means to mit- reforest damaged areas.
igate those risks. Mitigation programs that require some financial input
Insurance density-defined as the share of the from beneficiaries through cost recovery mechanisms
potential property loss that is insured-is generally could help educate the popuLation about the risk and
low in developing countries, where many people can- cost of disasters and the need to mitigate them. Such
not afford to purchase insurance (see chapter 4). Reg- programs could be developed and overseen by
ulators should support greater penetration of insurance CENAPRED and assisted by student mitigation teams.
in Mexican society and greater access to the insurance FONDEN could also require municipalities or states to
mechanism for people and enterprises of modest participate in mitigation projects by conditioning assis-
means. Regulation should also encourage the broad tance on participation in such projects. Support, for
provision of technical assistance for loss management example, could be conditioned on the state's commit-
and premium pricing to provide incentive for miti- ment to review and update building and zoning codes
gation investment. and to carry out a comprehensive hazard assessment.
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Chaptei 4
Mitigating Losses by Transferring Risk
to the Insurance Industry
In most countries in which potential losses are insured, sionally, reinsurance coverage is canceled altogether
catastrophe risk is transferred from the national insur- after a disaster (as it was in some small island coun-
ance system into worldwide risk-sharing pools. These tries hit by severe tropical cyclones). Often some risk
pools are managed by international reinsurance com- mitigation has been requirecL to reattract the reinsur-
panies and backed by substantial capital resources, ance industry
sometimes supported by generous tax regimes that A number of mechanisms have been developed in
allow the accumulation of reserves against future cat- wealthier countries in recent decades to cope with
astrophes out of pre-tax income. In countries without large risk exposures. National disaster funds have been
well-developed direct insurance systems and countries established in Turkey and Mexico. Compulsory state-
in which the potential loss is very large, much of the mandated insurance-based pools-often backed by
catastrophic risk remains within the country, where it high-level reinsurance or capital market instruments-
has the potential to adversely affect macroeconomic have been established in Florida, France, New Zealand,
variables. and Norway In Tokyo financial instruments have been
developed that rely on objective measures of the sever-
ity of the event (rather than the loss). All of these mea-
Insurance and Reinsurance Coverage sures could potentially be applied in developing countries.
throughout the World (For a description of some cf these mechanisms, see
annex 3.)
One measure of the extent of insurance coverage with-
in a country is insurance density, the estimated Table 4.1 Estimates of insurance density
proportion of private property (buildings and con- (percent)
tents) insured against natural hazard. Insurance den- F' - i
Evcnlt/llcatioi7l Tnlsar-cmcr n/salt
sity varies across countries and across types of events
(table 4. 1). E--a tl,,quakc6(table 4.1). ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~South A-rica 95
As table 4.1 indicates, a high level of income is nec- Svdney Australia 90
essary for high insurance density. Even in high-income Israel 90
countries, however, density can be low if the risk and Nancouver. Canada 50
Lalilornia, United States 40
possible severity of an event is high (as in Japan). Italy 20
The reinsurance markets have historically adopted Belgluti 10
an implicit financing approach under which losses N4exieL <10
incurred in one period are "paid back" in subsequent Tokc Japan 5
periods through increases in the cost of reinsurance. Flood
As a result, reinsurance prices have fluctuated wide- United Sntor 190
ly, and these fluctuations are passed on to the con- Germany <10
sumer. Rate increases after natural disasters can be Netherlands <5
large enough to affect the viability of businesses. Occa- Source: Swiss Reinsurance Co. 1997.
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Demand for Property and Casualty Insurance then. In 1996 insurance density in Mexico was among
in Mexico the lowest in the world for countries with similar income
levels (table 4.3).
The Mexican property and casualty (or "general") insur- The limited capacity to consume insurance in Mexi-
ance market is underdeveloped, with the great major- co may reflect the high cost of catastrophic insurance
ity of property owners uninsured against major natural coverage in many parts of the country In area highly
catastrophes. According to the 1990 population and prone to earthquake, including Mexico City annual prop-
housing census, 8.2 million of Mexico's 16 million hous- erty coverage costs about 0.5 percent of the amount
es (51 percent) were built with solid materials. Assum- insured. Insuring a house worth $20,000 wvould thus
ing 85 percent of these homes had potable water and cost about $ 100 a year-about 3 percent of the average
drainage, about 7 million houses in Mexico were Mexican's annual income. It is unrealistic to expect
insurable in 1990. Given an estimated annual rate of low-income families in developing countries to allocate
increase in housing of 1.85 percent since 1990, about this large aproportion of their income to insurance when
8.3 million houses were insurable in 1998. Of that num- most of their income is devoted to food, shelter, and
ber, only 150,000 homes, or 1.8 percent of the market, transport.
were actually insured in 1998, according to industry In contrast, the country's major corporate and nation-
sources. More than 8 million homes in Mexico are thus al public sector assets employ world standard risk man-
insurable but uninsured. agement methodologies. About 90 percent cf industrial
Themainreasonsforlackof coveragearelackof aware- enterprises and 50 percent of commercial enterprises
ness and understanding of the role of insurance, the belief are insured. The rate of coverage is much lower in the
that the govemment will fund any serious losses arising small business and private property sector, where only
from natural disasters, and lack of income. While more about 2 percent of the market is insured.
research needs to done on the relationship between income The public sector accounts for about a third of all
levels and insurance consumption, the data suggest that property insurance premiums in Mexico. Federally owned
high and evenly distributed income is correlated with assets appear to be adequately insured. State and munic-
increased insurance consumption (table 4.2). ipal governments appear to be insured on an ad hoc
Insurance consumption in Mexico rose before the basis, however, and their coverage may be insufficient.
1994-95 economic shock, but it has dropped since Increasing demand for insurance in Mexico will
Table 4.2 Insurance penetration and macroeconomic Table 4.3 Insurance penetration in selected cleveloping
indicators in selected countries, 1996 countries, 1996
Insuurance Per copita Insurarice
premnnres consurnmpon of pr-em u o
GDP per capitao GnP cs Gi percentage rnsuratncc" as a pe7rcertage
Canoutry 'IJ.S dloZlars) coejfcicntt! of GDP" Country (U.S. doloars) of GDP'
L.nited Sta es 26,030 <35 4.8c Panama 82 2.70
United Kingclom 19,720 <35 3.4 Costa Rica 61 2.28
Spain 14,810 <35 2.9 Columbia 39 1.77
Sweden 28,271 <35 2.3 Slovakia 62 1.76
Argentina 8,584 >45 1.2 Poland 56 1.62
Mexico 3,512 >45 0.8 Tunisia 32 1.51
Philippines 1,197 >45 0.8 Venezuelab 46 1.49
Zambia 325 >45 0.6 Thailand 40 1.32
Russia 28 0.95
a. The Gini coefficient is a measure of income distribution. The lower the Mexico 28 0.81
coefficient the more equally income is distributed. Peru 17 0.68
b. Exclusive oflife insurance. Peru_ 17 _0.68
c. The consumption figure is heavily influenced by the private health a. Exclusive of life insurance.
insurance system. b. Figures include some social insurance.
Source: Swiss Reinsurance 1998. Source Swiss Reinsurance Co. 1998.
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depend on several factors. Income levels must rise so to place a policy with a foreign insurer. Second, the
that more of the population will be able to afford prop- Mexican insurance industry is currently preoccupied
erty insurance. Greater awareness of insurance prod- with developing the pension and life insurance mar-
ucts must also be created, and the population must come kets. Relatively little attention has been paid to the
to understand that the government cannot meet all needs property and casualty market. Third, the leading insur-
following serious catastrophes. ance companies in Mexico are privately owned and
may have a more conservative approach to under-
writing and growth than traded companies wiLh access
Supply of Property and Casualty Insurance to strong capital markets.
in Mexico Mexican insurance companies do not offer stand-alone
catastrophic insurance, which must be purchased as an
Lack of property and casualty insurance coverage in extension of a basic fire policy. About 50-80 percent of
Mexico appears to be caused largely by demand-side Mexicans buying fire coverage purchase catastrophic cov-
rather than supply-side factors. Although some factors erage. While most insurance is priced competitively, earth-
distort the supply of property and casualty insurance quake coverage is subject to an industrywide price
in Mexico, excess catastrophic reinsurance capacity is agreement approved by the government. In practice, how-
available and a potentially large distribution system ever, earthquake rates are discounted.
has been developed. Moreover, by 2000 the market will
be open to unconstrained competition. Reinsurance
Premiums for property and casualty insurance against
natural catastrophes reached 1.6 billion pesos (about
Mexico has the most concentrated insurance industry $200 million) at the end of 1997, 37 percent of the
in Latin America. In 1997 the top five insurers wrote amount spent on fire and catastrophic premiums. About
70 percent of all property insurance policies. (Compa- 1. 1 billion pesos of this amount was transferred to
rable figures for other Latin American countries were reinsurance companies.
27 percent in Argentina, 51 percent in Brazil and Reinsuring domestic risk makes sense, because it
Chile, 50 percent in Colombia, and 43 percent in helps local insurers spread risks over a worldwide pool
Venezuela.) Although concentration in Mexico has of insurers. However, catastrophe reinsurance pricing
dropped since 1997 as a result of the influx of new com- was very volatile in the late 1.990s (table 4.4). The very
panies, it still remains much higher than in other high catastrophe reinsurance premium rates in 1994
countries in the region. and 1995 reflected the enormious losses incurredby the
Development of the property and casualty insur- global reinsurance sector in 1992 through 1994 and the
ance sector is inhibited by several factors. First, all tight worldwide market for reinsurance that followed.
policies written in Mexico must be underwritten by With increasing capacity attracted by high profits, prices
local underwriters unless special authority is granted have dropped in recent years. Given Mexico's heavy and
Table 4.4 Reinsurance pricing of catastrophic risks in Mexico, 1994-98
(percent)
itemii 1994 1995 1996 1997 1 998
Catastrophe reinsurance coverage as a percentage
of reference loss' Up to 122 7-156 3-118 2-140 2-170
Rate on line paid Ipercent sum at risk for reinsurers) 5 4.4 4.5 3.0 1.7 1.0
Pure risk rate on line (percent stim at risk for reinsurers) 0.7 1.6 2.0 1.5 1.2
a. Reference loss is the estimated insured loss for which primary insurers are liable in the event of a major natural disaster.
b. Rate on line is the reinsurance premium paid as a percentage of the layer of catastrophe reinsurance purchased.
Source: Mexican Insurance Association.
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growing reliance on this method of risk transfer, Sale of Insurance
mechanisms may need to be created to cushion the Insurance is sold largely through agents and brokers
insuring public from price shocks (which may result licensedbytheinsurancesupervisor,theNationallnsur-
from disasters occurring outside Mexico, most likely ance Commission. About 20,000 agents and brokers are
in the United States or Japan). licensed, although the majority work part time or are
The total underwriting profit made by offshore rein- inactive, according to industry sources.
surers in recent years from fire insurance (including Insurance can also be purchased through banks in
catastrophic coverage) has been very high relative to Mexico. Experience elsewhere in the world suggests that
premiums, despite the large number of earthquakes sales through banks are likely to represent the fastest
and hurricanes, some of which caused considerable means of expanding market penetration amnong small
damage (see annex 2). This demonstrates the market businesses and individuals, especially if an active mort-
failure of the insurance mechanism in Mexico. The rein- gage market is developed by the main commercial banks.
surance mechanism can be economically effective
only if the underlying insurance industry covers a
high proportion of risks in the country (table 4.5). Mitigation of Risk by Insurance Companies
Compulsory Reserves Mexican insurance companies have done li:tle to con-
tribute to the prevention or mitigation of damage from
Another source of additional potential market distortion disasters. Higher premiums for earthquake coverage
in Mexico arises from the requirement that all insurers are charged for buildings without seismic resistant design
set aside 35 percent of their cumulative earthquake features. Because quality control during construction is
premiums as reserves. For the industry as a whole, often lax or nonexistent, however, lower premiums for
more than $400 million was held in reserves in 1998, buildings that are supposed to be earthquake-resistant
and these are required to be invested in liquid, short- do little to mitigate disasters.
term government bonds. Collaboration between the Mexican insurance com-
The legal status of these reserves remains unclear. panies and the National Autonomous University of Mex-
Mexican regulators interpret the law to mean that earth- ico has taken place, but the work has focused only on
quake reserves are held in perpetuity against infrequent tariff setting and reserves. Contacts with C] NAPRED
but large catastrophes. The industry position is that have been superficial, and no actions hav2 resulted
they are part of capital and revert to shareholders in from them to date.
the event that the business is terminated or ceases to
write catastrophic risk policies. Rules are currently
being drafted to clarify the status of these funds and Recommendations
ensure a more effective relationship between risk expo-
sure and prudential management of insurers' balance Private insurance companies in Mexico are better able
sheets. than the public sector to deal with risk. Much needs to
Table 4.5 Underwriting profit earned by offshore reinsurers, 1995-97
(iv mors of U S. do lars)
jt, i1, , 999 196 1997
Prope[nx ( l(e' premiums Written in Mex.co 45t.5 448.5 488.2
Prern:ums remnsured 315.1 305.6 336.8
L_r.de-writing profit o foreign reinsurers (before reserves) 105.1 183.6 159.6
.rsurance claims paid 265 7 40
\umnher of earthqiaakcie 3 1 0
Numlber of windstormrs (inciuc ing hurricanes 1 3 3 2
Source Mexican Insurance Association and Nat onal Insurance Commission.
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be done, however-including getting support from mul- * In order to raise insurance awareness, the mandato-
tilateral agencies-before insurance can play an impor- ry automobile liability insurance requirement,
tant role in preventing and mitigating the effects of disasters. which was postponed, should be implemented as
Private insurers should be encouraged to deal with soon as possible. At the same time, the insurance
the risks faced by small and medium-size enterprises. industry, in cooperation with the government, should
Letting the private sector deal with this part of the mar- be encouraged to educate the public about insurance.
ket would reduce the load on the public sector at the * The govemment may wish to consider providing some
time of a natural disaster, and it would generate foreign incentives for householders and small businesses to
exchange inflows at a time when the balance of payments buy insurance, possibly through the use of (means-
may be under pressure. Private sector involvement would tested) vouchers or tax rebates.
also lead to speedier claims assessment and settlement. Improvements in insurance coverage could also be
In addition, insurers in a developed market generate use- achieved by changing the public sector's procurement
ful risk management information for businesses and indi- process. The governments nmandatory tendering pro-
vidual homeowners because the price of insurance curement process has resulted in a suboptimal level of
rates varies according to the characteristics of the risk. insurance coverage for all but the most sophisticated
To increase insurance awareness and density, insur- purchasers of insurance (such as PEMEX). Given that
ance products must be made available to the public at 90 percent of all govemment business (other than PEMEX)
affordable prices. Catastrophe insurance can currently is currently placed with the two leading private insur-
be purchased in Mexico only as part of fire insurance, ance companies, the current individual government
and the cost of such insurance is prohibitively high for agency approach appears to be inefficient. Consolida-
most Mexicans, especially those in Mexico City A num- tion of purchasing combined. with the employment of
ber of changes could be made in the short term to increase international brokers and risk transfer specialists should
capacity and reduce prices: be considered for all public sector risks.
* Catastrophic premium rates could be formally dereg- The efficiency of insurance as a risk transfer mecha-
ulated, with a maximum tariff set at the current level. nism could he increased if pLblic sector agencies pur-
Deregulating premiums would mean that consumers chased higher levels of catastrophic coverage while
could benefit from low reinsurance costs. absorbing higher levels of initial losses. The Ferrocarriles
* The discontinued 10 percent compulsory surcharge Nacionales de Mexico (national rail carrier), for example,
on earthquake premiums could be reintroduced and purchased a $20 million mul:i-risk policy, which stipu-
extended to all catastrophic classes (including civil lated that only the first $1 rnillion were available for
disturbances). These funds could be placed in a cen- property losses. The overall level of coverage was gross-
tral pool managed by the Mexican Insurance Associ- ly inadequate and failed to cover much of the damage to
ation for use in smoothing out reinsurance pricing railway tracks incurred in the 1998 flooding in Chiapas.
cycles and as a guarantee fund in the event that any Insurance advisers putting the insurance programs
insurer became insolvent following a major disaster. together set prices so low that it is not possible to design
Companies could continue to be required to accu- properly researched risk management programs that
mulate catastrophic reserves up to an agreed upon take a holistic approach to mitigation, loss control, and
standard retention level. rsk transfer. Information provided to insurers reported-
• If the insurance industry is not prepared to provide ly includes only details of a few peak risks for some agen-
catastrophe-only coverage, an industry-run pool could cies; very little information is provided on other exposures.
also be required to offer such coverage, which would Insurers should be provided with adequate information
be sold through private insurers. The pool would be on risk exposure, and large intemational brokers should
available only to insured risks, however. be permitted to participate in the tendering process.
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Chapte- 5
Using New Financial Instruments
to Transfer and Finance Risk
Dealing with the effects of naLural catastrophes has proved internationally through insurance and reinsurance. In
extremely disruptive to the budgetary process in Mexico. developing countries a combination of low incomes and
What strategies can the Mexican government adopt to lack of awareness about insurance means that less than
help it deal with these cnses more effectively? How can 10 percent of private property is typically insured. As
effective disaster relief be provided without derailing other a consequence, the global reirnsurance market cannot
programs? This chapter examines the options available be accessed. Catastrophe boncLs may provide a means
to the govemment for transferring and financing risk, sug- of circumventing the underdeveloped state of the insur-
gests some steps to take to pursue these options, and makes ance industry in many developi-ng countries exposed to
recommendations for administering the Fund for Natur- catastrophe risk.
al Disasters (FONDEN) more effectively Catastrophic risk transfer alternatives have been used
for a variety of risks, including hurricane and earthquake
risk in the United States and Japan, flood risk in most of
New Financial Instruments for Transferring Risk the world, and storm risk in Europe. These tools could
be extended to developing countries if the right structure
Peak catastrophe risks throughout the world far were created to transfer risk and the right information pro-
exceed the capacity of the insurance and reinsurance vided to professional risk takers. The development of both
industries to insure them. Available capacity falls far appropriate institutional structures and proper modeling
short of the estimated damages from even a single peak of the risk exposure are essential if these alternative risk
catastrophic event (such as a major earthquake on the transfer mechanisms are to be used in Mexico.
New Madrid fault in the United States, which could cost
up to $110 billion in direct losses). In such an event it Catastvophe Bonds and Options
is estimated that more than a third of the U.S. insur-
ance industry would become insolvent, even after allow- Although the insurance risk exchanges have yet to
ing for reinsurance of their exposures (Insurance Services develop a major presence, they are growing, with total
Office 1999). risk transfer amounting to about $3 billion to date.
Recognizing the inability of the insurance industry The Chicago Board of Trade lrst launched catastro-
to cover all catastrophic risks, insurers and corporations phe futures and options in December 1992. Since then
have sought to spread these risks to the capital markets the Catastrophe Exchange (CATEX) and the Bermu-
by issuing catastrophe bonds and options and other da Commodities Exchange have begun trading
similar instruments. The development of computer mod- insurance risk. In 1999 the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
eling of natural perils and the growing understanding change introduced temperature-extreme derivatives,
of catastrophic risk among institutional investors is which had been trading over-the-counter among ener-
increasing market capacity of these new financial instru- gy utilities in the United States. These derivatives are
ments (Froote 1998). designed to enable energy utilities to smooth income
In industrial countries, where a high proportion of when power usage is low because of mild winters or
property is insured, much catastrophic risk is spread cool summers.
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Act of God bonds were first issued in 1996. These Risk Transfer and the Fund for Natural Disasters
bonds-which are often structured as reinsurance
arrangements for legal and tax purposes-are nothing Funds earmarked for relief and reconstructicn after catas-
more than regular bonds issued with embedded con- trophe events in Mexico are maintained in FONDEN.
tingent options that provide the right to withhold The fund has three main strategic objectives:
some or all of the principal and accrued interest in the * Complement the systems of civil protection and assis-
event of a defined trigger event. Between 1996 and 1998 tance to victims.
this market (including related instruments) issued more * Finance repairs of damage to infrastructure caused
than $2.5 billion of paper to about 50 institutional bydisasters,withoutaffectingthebudgetedprograms
investors. Spreads varied according to structure and and projects of the federal administration.
exposure but averaged about 4 percent over the Lon- * Promote state and municipal participation to create
don interbank offer rate (LIBOR). a partnership among the three levels of government
A catastrophe bond need not rely on measures of to deal with the negative impact of extreme events.
actual loss. The trigger could be an objective measure FONDEN is composed of three separate funds. The
of the intensity of an event, such as an earthquake or infrastructure fund provides for the repair of unin-
hurricane. One such bond has been issued for Tokyo sured infrastructure. The agriculture fund provides
earthquake risk, which pays out according to location immediate assistance to restore the productivity of
and magnitude, as measured by the Japanese Meteoro- low-income (subsistence) farmers. The ass.stance fund
logical Agency Countries could set up a catastrophe provides relief to low-income victims of d:sasters.
fund to issue such bonds, the proceeds of which Budgetary allocations for FONDEN have not been
would be held in escrow pending a trigger event. sufficient to cover the fund's obligations since 1996. In
No investor has yet lost money invested in these 1998, for example, FONDEN's budget was about $227
instruments. Some observers believe that the first real million, while its expenditures were expected to exceed
natural catastrophe will see the end of the market, as $500 million. The shortfall is made up by diverting
investors lose money and retreat from the market. funds from other government budgets.
This need not be the case if investors include partic-
ipation in these instruments as part of a diversified
portfolio. Indeed, investors have shown interest in
the new instruments because the natural risks cov- One way that Mexico could transfer its dlisaster risk
ered are typically uncorrelated with major financial out of the country would be for the government to
indices, thereby providing new opportunities for purchase catastrophe insurance. A hypothetical exam-
risk diversification. ple demonstrates how this option would function. For
purposes of illustration, assume that the government
Contingent Credit wants to be able to cover up to $500 million in infra-
structure losses caused by hurricanes, floods, and earth-
Another instrument used to finance large catastrophic quakes and that FONDEN is willing to absorb $25
losses is contingent credit with long maturities. Under million in losses per incident, up to a maximum of S50
a contingent credit arrangement, the lender charges a million. FONDEN could purchase such coverage for,
fee, which is paid as long as the trigger event does not say, S48 million a year (depending on the pricing cycle).
occur (the International Bank for Reconstruction and Doing so would put a ceiling of $98 million on its expen-
Development charges 0.75 percent). If an event does ditures ($48 million in premiums plus $50 million in
occur, the borrower can rapidly draw down funds. To maximum uninsured losses). It would provide cover-
be able to repay the credit, the borrower must have a age to segments of the society that would not have had
sufficient stock of reserves or future premium income. the resources to purchase insurance themselves, and it
Tf it does not, the government could assume the risk of would obligate both FONDEN and the insurer to take
repayment through the taxation base. actions to mitigate the level of risk.
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Transferring Risk through the Capital Markets on the ad hoc capture of funds allocated to other agen-
Another way in which FONDEN could transfer risk cies to meet its current requirements. To reduce the
would be to issue a bond in the international capital uncertainty and disruption to the budgetary process,
markets with characteristics similar to reinsurance. The FONDEN could use its current and future budgetary
federal government could, for example, issue a $500 funding allocations to finance extraordinary costs when
million bond to international investors, holding the pro- disaster-related damages costs are high.
ceeds of the bond in an escrow account. Funds held in The most promising option would be to establish a
escrow would be released to Mexico upon the occur- line of credit with a financial institution, which would
rence of catastrophes that cause more than a given provide funds in the event that catastrophic events
level of damage to infrastructure. If no disaster occurs, exceeded FONDEN's annual budgetary funding. Repay-
investors would retain the principal as well as the ment of the credit line would take place over a long peri-
interest earned on the bond. If a catastrophic event od of time (perhaps 12-15 years if multilateral funding
occurs, funds advanced to Mexico under the bond would were obtained). Although the government would have
be partially forgiven; interest on the advanced amounts to pay a commitment fee for the credit line, access to
would be partially or totally forgiven. the line would ensure an immediate source of funding,
Catastrophe bonds can be flexible and are designed obviating the need to divert funds from other govern-
to meet the particular needs of the insurer. Pricing of ment agencies. Credit line arrangements-which have
these instruments has been higher than the pricing of been used by insurance companies concerned about the
reinsurance, although it has been consistent with the impact on their cash flow of a major catastrophe event-
average pricing of reinsurance during the 1990s. are a useful tool because they involve no transfer of risk.
Given the novelty of these instruments and the risks The insurability of the risk is thus irrelevant.
faced in Mexico, a bond guarantee might be necessary
to attract investor interest in such instruments. The
World Bank's guarantee facility might be deployed to Using Alternative Risk Transfer Mechanisms to
provide credit enhancement and augment the attrac- Deal with Uninsurable and Uninsured Properties
tiveness and security of catastrophe bonds. A partial
risk guarantee would consist of a contract-signed by Because insurance coverage in Mexico is very limited,
the government, the World Bank, and investors-that the govemment is faced with large fiscal obligations fol-
would commit the Bank to pay investors the interest or lowing natural disasters. Some public sector properties
principal due in the event that the government could and infrastructure (such as utilities, certain roads, and
not do so. If the guarantee were paid out, it would water systems) can be insured at the state and municipal
become an obligation due from the government to the levels. Other assets, however, are uninsurable or are dif-
Bank. The lower interest that Mexico should offer on ficult for the insurance industry to evaluate and price.
the bond as a result of the Bank guarantee would more For these reasons, altematives to insurance, such as risk-
than compensate for the modest guarantee fee charged transfer and financing instruments, should be considered.
by the Bank.
Transferring Risk Borne by the Public
Financing Risk with Commercial Bank Credit Lines and Business Sectors
If the Mexican government cannot or prefers not to The govemment should seek to adopt efficient risk man-
transfer risk, it can explore various options for financ- agement techniques, including loss control, mitigation,
ing that risk. Because the size and frequency of the nat- and risk transfer. Catastrophe bond and option contracts
ural catastrophes covered by FONDEN vary from year could be used to insure state and municipal assets and
to year, annual funding requirements fluctuate widely. infrastructure (sewerage systems, uninsurable buildings)
Since supplementary funding from the government can- that may not attract the interest of the insurance indus-
not be requested during the year, FONDEN has relied try (because of their unusual nature or lack of compliance
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with building codes, for example) or may command mex operates on the basis of strict underwriting and
too high a premium for local governments to afford. They claims adjustments that are verified by a iarge team of
could also be used to cover small and medium-size field technicians. Since 1990 Agroasemex has been able
enterprises for which insurance is available but is too to place a relatively low-level stop loss program (75 per-
expensive for owners to purchase. The covering of such cent loss ratio in excess of the first 75 percent loss
enterprises through a financial instrument would free ratio, that is, any losses in excess of 75 percent of the
the government from having to extend financial assis- premium amount are paid by reinsurance up to a max-
tance followving a natural disaster. Bond and option instru- imum of 150 percent of the premium). Mexico is exper-
ments could be used to cover medium-size cash crop imenting with a number of other leading-edge ideas,
farmers. (In principle, such farmers could be insured including remote sensing of soil moisture content and
through the government's crop insurance program. In the use of French-style cooperatives to reduce moral
fact, however, such farmers remain uninsured.) hazard and information asymmetry.
The government could potentially bypass the entire The main drawback of all such individual assessment
insurance loss evaluation process by using an investment approaches is that they are extremely expensive to admin-
instrument that triggers or limits certain payments to ister and almost always require some forrn of govern-
investors based on objective indicators. Indicators, ment subsidy New approaches to crop-rela.ted disasters
such as earthquake tremors and hurricane wind speeds, in which payouts are related to objective measures of
can sometimes be transmitted to central satellite stations. rainfall and soil moisture rather than to crop yield
itself are being examined by a number of countries and
by the World Bank. Such approaches are potentially
Transferrnng Risk Borne by the Agricu1tlral Sector much less expensive to administer and still leave an
Many countries compensate farmers after natural dis- important role for the insurance sector.
asters, almost always doing so out of current bud-
getary resources. The degree of formality of these
compensation arrangements varies widely In Belgium Recommendations
and France, for example, a separate national agricul-
tural disaster fund compensates farmers. In Australia, During the past decade the insurance and capital mar-
Denmark, and Germany, compensation is distributed kets have developed several innovative techniques for
largely on an ad hoc basis. In the United States farm- transferring the risk associated with natural hazard
ers are eligible for free catastrophe insurance (subject events. The Mexican government should investigate
to a $50 administrative charge). Despite the low cost, how it could use these new products to make more
however, up to 20 percent of farmers remain uncovered efficient use of the assets it allocates following disas-
(politicians generally bail them out following disasters ters. By transferring risk to the private sector or financ-
anyway). ing the costs of disaster-related damage, Mexico could
As the damage done by natural disasters has grown, reduce the disruption to the budget process caused by
however, particularly in agricultural areas, governments unanticipated expenditures. In order to do so, it will
have found themselves unable to cover the costs of com- have to take several steps:
pensation, and politicians have come to recognize that * Reconstitute FONDEN as a legal entity that is capa-
disasters can inflict long-term damage on the economic ble of transferring risk.
base. In a number of countries (Australia and Morocco, * Group together similar risks in funds, so that they
for example) governments are attempting to find ways can be aggregated, priced, and transferred separate-
to reduce their contingent liabilities, by transferring catas- ly Allocate sufficient dedicated capital and premium-
trophic crop risk using private sector mechanisms. paying capacity to FONDEN to support its risk
In Mexico a well-developed agricultural insurance placements in the insurance or capital markets.
system is available through Agroasemex, the state-owned * Inventory all vital infrastructure, and estimate
agency set up to replace Anagsa in the late 1980s. Agroase- FONDEN's risk exposure. Catastrophe modeling-
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which analyzes the frequency of hazard events, the should be screened for economic viability in accor-
severity of the events, and the vulnerability and value dance with the standard cost-benefit criteria used to
of assets that are the responsibility of FONDEN- evaluate public investments.
could be used to make these estimates. * Consider linking the terms of FONDEN financing for
Develop financial models that allow various policy reconstruction following a disaster to the extent to
options to be evaluated. Financial modeling based which mitigation measures had been implemented
on the data developed in the catastrophe modeling before the disaster (possibly through cost-sharing
would yield various options and prices for the arrangements with states and municipalities).
transfer of risk. Clearly define the risks for which FONDEN bears
Risk management could also be improved by chang- responsibility, beginning with the infrastructure fund.
ing the way FONDEN operates. Specific recommenda- Limit coverage to those infrastructure items that are
tions include the following: essential to support the country's economic and social
* Refocus FONDEN's efforts by absorbing only those affairs following a natural disaster and those items
residual catastrophe risks that cannot be absorbed that have already been insured for noncatastrophic
by third parties, encouraging economically worth- risks. Limit agricultural coverage to farmers who are
while mitigation by the public sector, and fostering unable to afford private insurance; farmers who are
the development of private sector risk reduction able to afford private insurance should be obligated
and transfer mechanisms. to purchase it. Welfare payments to subsistence farm-
* Modify FONDEN's mandate so that it is permitted ers could be subsumed under the victims fund or
to disburse funds for research and training on miti- paid through other social safety net programs.
gating risk before a disaster occurs. Funding for * Establish guidelines to be followed by other gov-
research and training would represent an addition ernment agencies in managing the risks they bear.
to the annual budgets of executing agencies; the actu- FONDEN could, for example, specify the types and
al financing of mitigation programs would presum- acceptable limits for insurance coverage for various
ably be carried out as part of the public investment types of infrastructure. It could also help federal,
programs executed by the various govemment depart- state, and local authorities purchase property insur-
ments. Investment programs for mitigation works ance on a group basis.
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Chaprei- 6
Summary of Findings and
Recommendations
Mexico is vulnerable to a variety of natural disasters, Mexico has a good core of institutional capability to
including earthquakes, hurricanes, and volcanoes. Despite manage natural disasters, led by the Ministry of the Inte-
the frequency with which these disasters strike, how- rior and the Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources,
ever, inadequate investment is made in mitigation efforts, and Fisheries. High-level coordination and strategic
and insufficient funds are set aside to pay for relief and planning for disaster management need to be improved,
reconstruction efforts. As a result, when a disaster occurs, however.
the government is often forced to use funds that had
been allocated to other programs, disrupting the oper-
ations of those programs. The effect is to derail impor- Mitigate Risk
tant development efforts and possibly reduce growth.
The Mexican government could improve the way it The damage caused by disasters can be reduced by chang-
manages its risks so that ongoing programs are not dis- ing perceptions and behavior so that all members of soci-
rupted following a disaster. Doing so involves identify- ety place a high priority on safety in planning and
ing the risks the country faces, mitigating the damage development. This is important from a social and eco-
caused by those risks, and transferring the risk to other nomic standpoint, since, in the absence of ample insur-
parties (namely, insurance companies and the capital ance penetration in the private sector, a large proportion
markets). of catastrophic risks are de facto borne by the govern-
ment and society at large. All stakeholders must con-
tribute to the creation of a culture of safety Toward that
Identify Risk end, the government should develop strategies for improv-
ing education about disaster mitigation, creating incen-
Formulation of a risk management strategy must begin tives, and adopting regulations that will encourage
with the identification of risk. Mexico should identify the individuals and businesses to reduce the risks they face.
principal hazards it faces and assess the vulnerability of Information and education are key to raising aware-
principal settled areas, infrastructure, and economic assets. ness of risk and the importance of investing in mitiga-
The analysis should include estimates of the direct, indirect, tion measures. Active programs of dissemination, targeted
and secondary impacts of natural disasters. professional education, and broad public education on
Adequate funding must be maintained for the risk disaster risk and mitigation should be developed and
identification efforts already under way. The research delivered throughout Mexico. Programs should include
capacity of CENAPRED and the National Autonomous dissemination of information on natural hazard risk,
University of Mexico is excellent, but neither institu- mitigation, and insurance (possibly through a collabo-
tion receives the budgetary attention it deserves. Given rative effort by the government and the insurance indus-
the quality of their work on identifying risk and miti- try); the inclusion of disaster preparedness and mitigation
gating damage from volcanoes and earthquakes, their materials in elementary and high school curricula; and
mandate should be expanded to include hurricane and special programs to target low-income communities,
flood mitigation. which are often worst hit by disasters.
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The regulatory approach to encouraging disaster mit- participate in mitigation projects by conditioning
igation in Mexico requires a comprehensive reassess- assistance on cost-sharing. FONDEN's support to states
ment of the formal land use and building regulatory should be conditioned on a state's commitm,nt to review-
processes. New approaches to land use maniagement ing and updating building and zoning codes and to
and building quality management must be developed carrying out comprehensive hazard assessments.
that effectively contribute to public safety in the infor-
mal sector. Recognizing that most mitigation decisions
are made at the community level, policymakers must Transfer Risk
allocate resources to increasing capacity and authority
for risk management and disaster mitigation at the Private sector insurance companies cart be used to
state and community levels. help Mexico deal more effectively with risk in the pub-
While new and innovative approaches to regulation lic sector. The public sector should purchase insurance
are explored, new initiatives should focus on creating through international brokers and risk transfer spe-
positive incentives. Such incentives could include pro- cialists; individual agencies should not be purchasing
vision of community-level technical assistance for dis- insurance on their own. More cost-effective coverage
aster mitigation, establishment of "low-risk districts" should be purchased by increasing the dectuctible level
or historic centers that include tax incentives for those and purchasing higher levels of catastrophe coverage.
that invest in mitigation, granting of financial assistance Regulation of the insurance industry should sup-
for engineering analysis of risk, and establishment of port greater penetration of insurance in NMexican soci-
certification programs, such as the Pan-American Health ety and greater access to the insurance mechanism for
Organization program for health facilities. The private people and enterprises of modest means. Regulation
sector could consider donating engineering design assis- should also encourage the broad provisior. of technical
tance, providing it at low cost, or offering low-cost loans assistance for loss management and premium pricing
for mitigation efforts. to provide incentives for mitigation investment.
FONDEN's mandate should be modified so that it In order to increase insurance awareness and pene-
can provide funds for studies and training related to tration among small and medium-size enterprises and
disaster mitigation before catastrophic events occur. the general population, affordable insurance products
Even if the government cannot or prefers not to mod- must be available to the public. Capacity could be
ify that mandate, FONDEN can still play an important increased and prices reduced in several ways:
role in postdisaster mitigation in areas in which disas- * Catastrophic premium rates could be formally deregu-
ters are recurrent. Temporary employment programs lated, with a maximum tariff set at the current level.
established as part of the relief effort following a disas- * The discontinued 10 percent compulsory surcharge
ter could be used to implement mitigation measures, on earthquake premiums could be reintroduced
such as strengthening buildings in earthquake- and and extended to all catastrophe classes (including
wind-prone areas, improving irrigation facilities in civil disturbances). These funds could be placed in
drought-prone areas, resettling communities away from a central pool managed by the Mexican Insurance
hazardous sites, clearing stream beds and drainage chan- Association, which would help to stabilize reinsur-
nels, constructing flood protection, and reforesting dam- ance costs and cover catastrophe-induced insolvency
aged or destroyed areas. Companies could continue to be required to accu-
Mitigation programs that require some financial input mulate catastrophic reserves up to an agreed-upon
from benefnciaries through cost-recovery mechanisms standard retention level.
would help educate the population about the risk and * This industry-run pool could be required to offer
cost of disasters and the need to mitigate them. Such catastrophe-only coverage, which would be distrib-
programs could be developed and overseen by uted by insurance companies.
CENAPRED and assisted by student mitigation teams. * In order to raise insurance awareness, the mandatory
FONDEN could also require municipalities or states to automobile liability insurance requirement, which
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was postponed, should be implemented as soon as on the data developed in the catastrophe modeling
possible. would yield various options and prices for the
* The insurance industry, in cooperation with [he transfer of risk.
government, should be encouraged to educate the Group similar risks together in funds so that they can
public about insurance. be aggregated, priced, and transferred separately.
* The government should consider providing targeted Allocate to FONDEN sufficient dedicated capital and
incentives to expand insurance density premium-paying capacity to support its risk place-
ments in the insurance or capital markets.
Modify FONDEN's mandate so that it is permitted
Reorganize FONDEN to disburse funds for studies and training on miti-
gating risk before a disaster occurs. Funding for stud-
Before the Mexican government can make use of risk ies and training would represent an addition to the
transfer and risk-financing tools, it must modify the annual budgets of executing agencies; the actual
way FOINDEN is organized. Changes should include financing of mitigation works would presumably be
the following: carried out as part of the public investment programs
* Refocus FONDEN's efforts by absorbing only those executed by the various government departments
residual catastrophic risks that cannot be absorbed through their normal budgetary allocations. Invest-
by third parties, encouraging economically worth- ment programs for mitigation works should be
while mitigation by the public sector and fostering screened for economic viability in accordance with
the development of private sector risk reduction the standard cost-benefit criteria used to evaluate
and transfer mechanisms. public investments.
* Clearly define the risks for which FONDEN bears * Consider linking the terms of FONDEN financing
responsibility, beginning with the infrastructure fund. for reconstruction following a disaster to the extent
Limit coverage to those infrastructure items that are to which mitigation measures had been implemented
essential to support the country's economic and social before the disaster (possibly through varying the cost-
affairs following a natural disaster and those items sharing arrangements with states and municipalities).
that have already been insured for noncatastrophic * Establish guidelines to be followed by other gov-
risks. Limit agricultural coverage to farmers who are ernment agencies in managing the risks they bear.
unable to afford private insurance; farmers who are FONDEN could, for example, specify the types and
able to afford private insurance should be obligated acceptable limits for insurance coverage for various
to purchase it. Welfare payments to subsistence farm- types of infrastructure. It could also help federal,
ers could be subsumed under the victims fund or state, and local authorities purchase property insur-
paid through other social safety net programs. A sim- ance on a group basis.
ilar approach of identifying those that can afford
private insurance could be developed for the victim
assistance fund. The Role of the World Bank
* Reconstitute FONDEN as a legal entity that is capa-
ble of transferring risk. The study has helped the World Bank define more clear-
* Inventory all vital infrastructure and estimate ly ways in which it could help developing countries
FONDEN's risk exposure. Catastrophe modeling- manage disaster risk more effectively Instruments that
which analyzes the frequency of hazard events, the could be of value include the following:
severity of the events, the vulnerability of assets that * Loans for investment in mitigation and reconstruction.
are the responsibility of FONDEN, and the value of Loans could be provided to finance retrofitting plans
those assets- could be used to make these estimates. (at schools, hospitals, public buildings) and recon-
* Develop financial models that allow various policy struction of infrastructure damaged by natural disas-
options to be evaluated. Financial modeling based ters. An important feature could be to link the terms
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of reconstruction financing to the extent of mitigation * Contingent loansfor risk financing. Catastrophe risk is
carried out by the final beneficiaries of the financing. normally "packaged" into "layers" and inanced or
A technical assistance component could support capac- transferred through a variety of arrangements, includ-
ity building for various aspects of disaster manage- ing primary insurance, reinsurance, credit financing,
ment. These could include data generation; risk and bond and derivative financing. The combina-
assessment and modeling; development of disaster tion of instruments used will depend on specific cir-
management systems and plans; redrafting of build- cumstances, including the relative costs of'the various
ing codes and improvement of physical planning cri- instruments at the time the placements are made. The
teria and systems; development of retrofitting plans; Bank could consider providing contingent loans to
development of schemes for new risk financing and finance a credit layer in a risk management package.
transfer arrangements and instruments; and design of * Partial risk guarantees. The Bank operates a guaran-
improved laws, regulations, and policies to support tee program that supports private investment in bor-
better risk management. rowing countries by guaranteeing against risks
Contingent loansfor reconstruction. To make sure that associated with policy or contractual performance
funds are accessible immediatelywhen disaster strikes, by the government. Under the program, -he govern-
the Bank could establish a credit line that could be ment counterguarantees the Bank guarantee by agree-
drawn upon under certain conditions. Establishing ing to repay the Bank for any payments it makes to
such a line would speed the delivery of funds dur- investors under the terms of the guarant2e. In prin-
ing emergencies. The credit line agreernent would ciple, this program might provide credit er hancement
specify the trigger events that would make Bank funds for catastrophe bonds and commercial contingent
available. It would also include guidelines govern- credit lines, thereby improving their terms and attrac-
ing the use of funds (eligible expenditures; dis- tiveness to investors.
bursement, procurement, and financial management This case study and future discussions wiv.h the Mex-
arrangements; and on-lending terms to final benefi- ican government should help refine this menu of options
ciaries, which could vary with the extent to which so that it addresses Mexico's primary concerns. The
mitigation measures had been implemented before effort should enhance the quality of the Bank's lend-
the disaster). Commitment fees would be paid before ing and nonlending activities in the increasingly impor-
the loan was activated. tant area of natural disaster risk management.
Annex I
Geographic Distribution of Major Hazards
in Mexico
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Annex 2
Estimated Cost of Disaster Events
in Mexico, 1980-98
Mexico experienced dozens of disasters between killed in these events, which cost the economy about
1980 and 1998 (table Al). About 9,515 people were $12 billion in losses.
Table A2 Estimated direct costs of disaster events in Mexico, 1980-98
Reportecd crect !osscs
Yea-/ex eat/location Ccsaoottes and damage (ilIliors of D'S. dolla-s)
1980
Flood
Tijuana and Ensenada, Baja California 3 people killed, 20 people missing,
6 towns destroyed, 30,000 victims 87.0
FAas plant fire
Xalostoc, State of Mexico 4 people injured 0.8
Drought
Coahuila and Sinaloa 222.6
Hurricane Allen
Matamoros 25,000 people left homeless 4.3
1981 Information on losses not available
1982
Erupt'on of Chichonal volcano 42 people killed, 22,000 evacuated, 150,000 victims-
including 17,000 Zoque Indians. Complete loss
of cultivable land within 10 kilometer radius;
partial loss of lands within 10-15 kilometer radius.
Damage done to 4,000 hectares of banana crops,
15,000 hectares of corn, 905 hectares of bean crops,
10,000 hectares of coffee, and 17,000 hectares
of cocoa. Eight airports temporarily shut down,
access roads closed for weeks. Carpet of ash and
volatile particles within 15 kilometer radius 117.0
Hurricane Paul
Sinaloa 257,000 victims, 7,299 homes damaged. Complete loss
of 7,334 hectares of soy crops, 2,300 hectares of corn,
and 1,300 hectares of vegetables. Forty percent of 75,000
hectares of soy crops, 14,000 hectares of corn crops,
and 13,400 hectares of vegetable crops damaged.
Damage to industrial and commercial structures 82.4
Floods
Throughout the country 8 people killed, 5 injured, 285,511 victims. Damage
to homes, highways, electricity and telecommunications,
and agriculture 114.6
42
Annex 2 43
Table A2 (continued)
Reportedcl direct losses
Year/event/llocation Casaalties and damage (millions oj U.S. dollars)
1983 Information on losses not available
1984
Industrial explosion
San Juan Ixhuatepec 1,000 people killed, 5,000 victims, 200 houses
completely destroyed, 150 homes left uninhabitable 26.3
1985
Earthquake
Mexico City 6,000 people killed, 30,000 injured, 150,000 victims,
30,000 homes destroyed, 60,000 damaged. Damage to all
productive, health, and service sectors 4,104.0a
Floods
Throughout the country 43 people killed, 47 injured, 73,241 victims.
Damage to housing, highways, electricity and
telephone system, and agriculture 39.4
Torrential rains
Nayarit 48,000 victims, 22 houses damaged, 3 highways affected.
Complete loss of dozens of hectares of vegetables and grains 16.4
1986
Fire
Veracruz 1.5
1987
Snowfall Mexico City, States of Mexico and Hidalgo-
6 people killed. Damage to water infrastructure,
electricity transformers, 1,300 hectares of crops,
and vehicles (as a result of traffic accidents) 0.3
1988
Industrial explosion
Ixhuapan, Veracruz 20 people killed, 15,000 left homeless, 18,000
barrels of oil burned 0.3
Forest fires 500,000 hectares of forest burned 1,250.0
Drought in agricultural zones
Throughout the country 542,000 hectares of crops completely destroyed,
439,000 hectares partially damaged 168.4
Hurricane Gilbert
Four states and Nuevo Leon 225 people killed, 46 injured, 139,000 evacuated,
51,000 victims, 9,739 homes damaged; 364,000
hectares of agricultural land damaged. Buildings,
roads, electricity lines, highways, crops, shipping,
communications, and urban services also affected 76.0
Other hurricanes
Throughout the country 417 people killed, 106 injured, 192,000 victims,
31,000 homes damaged; 1.35 million hectares
of agricultural land completely destroyed, 1.73 million
hectares partially damaged; 74,683 head of cattle lost 597.6
(table continues on next page)
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Table A2 (continued)
Reporredi direct losses
Year/er'ur/oerc0on Casualties ar,d damage (millions rU.S. dollars)
Frost
Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, 50 percent of coffee crop, 250 tons
Chihuahua, Veracruz, Puebla, and Tlaxcala of oranges, and 2,000 head of cattle lost 0.6
1989 80,000 hectares of agricultural land damaged c48.0
Forest fire
Quintana Roo
1990
Frost
Tamaulipas,Veracruz, Baja California 10,000 hectares of crops damaged in Tamaulipas 1.2
Hurricanie Diana
Veracruz, Hidalgo, and Puebla 139 people killed, 56 missing, 75,000 victims.
Highways and train tracks blocked in 6 states;
40,000 hectares of agricultural land lost. 90.7
Flood
Chihuahua 200 people killed, 5,000 victims, 700 houses damaged 2.5
Fmosts
Nuevo Leon, Baja California, Durango, 52 people killed, 500 families affected 0.1
Coahuila, Sonora, Mexico, Tamaulipas,
Veracruz, and Chihuahua
1991
Industrial explosion 6 people killed, 329 injured 1 50.0
Veracruz
Floods (dam breaks)
Zacatecas 5 people killed, 12,000 cut off from communication,
10,500 victims, 2 bridges destroyed 0.7
W\inter stormns
Baja California Sur, Sonora, Sinaloa, 153 communities flooded, 40,000 victims, 40 percent
and Chihuahua of streets in La Paz, Baja California, destroyed; 50,000
agriculture hectares completely lost, 25,000 pigs lost,
160 kilometers of irrigation canals destroyed, damage
to bridges (road and railroad) and highways. 16.8
1992
lndustrial explosion
Guadalajara 212 people killed, 1,480 injured, 13,930 victims,
1,425 homes totally destroyed, 150 homes with minor
damage; 450 businesses destroyed, contents of 802
households destroyed, 637 vehicles destroyed, 8 kilometers
of streets destroyed, 300,000 cubic meters of urban .
area affected 65.0
Rain and snow
Sinaloa Crops lost 0.2
Tornado
Reynosa More than 3,000 homes flooded 10.5
Tornado
Comitan de Dominguez, Chiapas 375 homes damaged 1.3
Hurrican.e Winif-eci
Manzanillo 3,000 victims, 2,000 hectares of plantain crops damaged 8.0
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Table A2 (continued)
Repo ntel doer;ct losses
Yh rleveolt/eioraioln Cestwittes andLi dalagec (oullians of u.S. dollars,
Wilnter storms
Nayarit 64 people killed, 70 premises flooded, 100,000 people
left homeless; 104,000 hectares of agriculture and several
highways damaged 78.0
Hall storms
Ttlaxcala 11 people injured, 2,000 families affected, 2,000
hectares of crops damaged or destroyed 0.2
Hail storms
Guerrero and Tlaxcala 30,000 hectares of crops and orchids destroyed 2.3
Frost
Zacatecas 350,000 hectares of agricultural land damaged; 27.0
Eruptions of Popocatepeti volcano (1993-98) 5 people killed, 26,000 evacuated from 23 communities.
Damage from falling ash to pastures and urban centers 12.0
Hurricane Gert
Veracruz, San Luis Potosi, Hidalgo, 7 people killed, 50,000 victims, 5,000 homes flooded,
Guerrero, Tamaulipas, and Quintana Roo 70,000 people cut off from communications 18.1
N in.cr storms
Baja California (January) 20 people killed, 10,000 victims. Communications and
agricultural zones severely damaged 32.0
<inter storms
Baja California (November) 3 people killed, 10,000 victims. Interruption of public
services, damage to bridges, highways, pipelines, and vessels 63.4
Frost
Tlaxcala 1,000 hectares of crops damaged 0.1
1994
Drought 10,000 head of cattle lost 2.7
Sonora
Drought 3,000 head of cattle lost 0.8
Caborca and Sonora
Hail storms
Puebla 1,100 hectares of crops damaged or destroyed 0.3
1995
Hurricane Ismael
Baja California peninsula, Sinaloa, and Jalisco 56 people killed, dozens missing, 52 vessels damaged,
20 vessels sunk, 29 vessels disabled, 3 lost. Damage
to infrastructure 26.0
iu-rriyae Opal
Campeche and Tabasco 14 people killed, 26,874 victims, 35,229 homes damaged,
14,370 hectares of pastures damaged. Damage to hydraulic,
road, communications, and electricity infrastructure 124.7
Earthquake
Guerrero and Oaxaca 10,000 victims, 3,611 homes damaged-including
1,200 completely destroyed 21.1
Forest Fees
Throughout the country 127 victims, 18 homes damaged, 114,000 hectares
of agricultural land damaged 1.0
(table continues on next page)
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Table A2 (continued)
Reported direct losses
Year/event/location Casualties and damage (milliornsof U.S. dollars)
Gas pipeline explosion
Tabasco 12 people killed, 23 injured, 10 buildings damaged,
telephone lines damaged 4.0
Drought
Chihuahua 135,000 head of beef cattle lost 36.7
Drought
Durango, Tamaulipas, Hidalgo, and Puebla 53,000 head of beef cattle lost 14.4
Forest fire
Cancuin and Quintana Roo 250 hectares of rain forest damaged 1.0
Storm
State of Mexico 157 homes flooded 0.5
Drought
Sinaloa 5,000 head of beef cattle lost 1.4
Other droughts
In agricultural zones throughout the country 45,000 hectares of agricultural land totally lost,
31,000 partially damaged; 98,700 head of cattle lost 40.4
Other hydrometeorological events
Throughout the country 282 people killed, 75 people injured, 75,969
homes damaged, 335,140 victimns; 392,844 hectares
of agricultural land destroyed, 340,609 hectares
partially damaged; 106,165 head of cattle lost 418.4
1996
Frosts
Chihuahua, Coahuila, Tamaulipas, Durango, 224 people killed, 70,250 hectares of crops
Mexico, Nuevo Leon, Aguascalientes, Michoacan, damaged, 90 percent of banana crop in Colima lost.
Veracruz, San Luis Potosi, Guanajuato, Colima, Highways temporarily closed 5.3
Hidalgo, and Jalisco
1997
Hurricane Pauline
Oaxaca and Guerrero 228 people killed, hundreds injured,
202,000 victims in 1,025 communities, 54,000 homes
destroyed; 179 drinking water systems destroyed,
damage to telecommunications and electricity systems;
186 kilometers of highway and 2,210 kilometers of rural
roads damaged 447.8
1998
Forest fires
Throughout the country 200,000 hectares of land damaged 1,620.0
Forest fires
Nuevo Leon, Morelos, Puebla, Oaxaca, 1,500 hectares of land damaged 12.2
and Chiapas
Hail storms
Oaxaca and Tamaulipas 480 homes damaged 1.7
Forest fire
Puebla and Tlaxcala 180 hectares of woods and pasture damaged 0.7
Forest fire
Puebla and Oaxaca 5,100 hectares damaged 41.3
Forest fire
Hidalgo, Veracruz, and Nuevo Leon 4,700 hectares damaged 38.1
Forest fire
Guadalajara 600 hectares damaged 4.9
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Table A2 (continued)
Reported direct losses
Year/eventllocation Casualties and damage (millions of US. dollars)
Forest fires
Veracruz, Coahuila, Nuevo Le6n, Hidalgo, 6,000 people evacuated 16,080 hectares
Michoacan, and San Luis Potosi of land damaged 130.2
Forest fire
Tabasco 50 hectares damaged 0.4
Forest fires
Coahuila and Guanajuato 1,600 hectares damaged 13.0
Fire in the public market
Mexico City 600 stalls destroyed 12.0
Forest fire
Federal District of Mexico 200 hectares damaged 1.6
Torrential rains
Chiapas 199 people killed, 28,753 initial victims, 700,000
people without electricity, 51 communities in 39
municipalities affected; 712 kilometers of paved roads
and 3,600 kilometers of rural roads damaged, 22 bridges
collapsed and 18 others damaged, 5 highways damaged 602.7
Note: Figures are based only on data available for reported losses and do not represent a comprehensive conomic assessment of all direct losses Figures
are based on dollar/peso conversion rate in the year the losses were incurred
a. Includes indirect costs of $515 million.
Source: Bitr5n Bitran 1999.
Annex 3
Examples of Catastrophe Funds
and Catastrophe Risk Pooling Used
in Other Countriles
Several countries have established institutions whose uals or property insured is located on Spanish terri-
main or sole objective is to fund the repair or replace- tory The amount of catastrophic coveraie proviced
ment of losses caused by catastrophic events. In most is equal to the amount of property insurance pur-
cases these institutions work in close collaboration chased by the insured. Only direct damages are cov-
with the local insurance industry and, in some instances, ered by the Consorcio; indirect damages can be insured
international reinsurers. The govemment acts as the rein- by private insurance companies. The Spanish gov-
sureroflastresortwhenreservedfundsarenotsufficient ernment guarantees all the liabilities contracted by
to pay losses incurred. Most funds charge a flat rate that the Consorcio (the guarantee has never been invoked,
does not discriminate based on the level of exposure or however).
vulnerability None of the funds seeks to earn a profit. The Consorcio's basic principles and modus operandi
are framed by the most recent modification to Law 21/1990
approved by the European Union. The law, which origi-
Spain nally banned state monopolies, was changed when poli-
cymakers realized that some state monopolies could serve
The Spanish government established the Consorcio de the public interest. Today the Consorcio Ls subject to
Compensacion de Seguros in 1941 -o provide soft financ- laws that apply to private sector insurance companies.
ing to Spanish life insurance companies that were unable The Consorcio's only source of revenue is the pre-
to meet their obligations. Shortly after the Consorcio miums it charges. Private insurance contpanies that
was established, catastrophic fires engulfed the port city underwrite the basic policies collect these premiums,
of Santander. In response to that crisis, the Consorcio which are then remitted to the Consorcio. The premi-
changed its basic functions and became a subsidiary ums are used both to create the necessary technical
insurance company, providing catastrophe coverage that reserves and maintain the required solvency margin and
is either not provided by insurance policies or was pro- to establish a special accumulative reserve fund. Prof-
vided by an insurance company that went bankrupt or its are not earned, as all resources, including investment
became insolvent. results, are added to the reserve fund.
The Consorcio provides coverage for all catastroph- The tariffs charged by the Consorcio are compen-
ic risks (earthquakes and tsunamis, floods, volcanic satory and do not reflect the degree of exposure to risk.
eruptions, atypical cvclonic storms, and other natural RatesrangefromO.092per 1,000 forhousingand offices
disasters). It also covers risks of political or social ori- to 0.25 per 1,000 for industrial risks. Public property
gin (terrorism, rebellion, mutiny, popular upheavals, tariffs range from 0.35 per 1,000 (for highways) to 2.0
and damage caused by the armed forces or the securi- per 1,000 (for port installations). Vehicles pay a flat fee.
ty forces in times of peace). Between 1980 and 1998 the Consorcio' loss ratio aver-
The Spanish system links the protection provided aged about 93 percent, with losses from floods account-
by the Consorcio with the different types of policies ing for 86 percent of losses and losses from terrorism
provide by private insurance companies (for exam- accounting for 10 percent. Claims are adjusted by a net-
ple, fire, motor, railroad) provided that the individ- work of specialized technicians that is kept on stand-by
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Payments to policyholders are made by the insurance The CCR competes successfully with national and
companies that underwrote the basic policies. foreign private reinsurers in the market, as local direct
The Consorcio does not cover agricultural risks. insurers are not required to purchase their reinsurance
Such risks are handled by a special system that the gov- through the CCR. More than 90 percent of direct
ernment coordinates through ENESA (Entidad Nacional insurers work with the CCR. The CCR provides insur-
de Seguros Agrarios-the National Agriculture Insurance ers with reinsurance plans that would be difficult to find
Agency), which operates a pool, called AGROSEGUROS, anywhere else or would be very expensive. The con-
made up of private insurance companies that wish to par- tracts allow direct insurers to create and increase cata-
ticipate as coinsurers. If the resources provided by this strophic loss reserves, which can make them less
pool are deemed insufficient, the Consorcio participates dependent on reinsurance in the long run.
as reinsurer. Although the Consorcio has participated in For agricultural risks, CCR finances and operates the
the pool since 1984, its involvement in the fund has been National Guarantee Fund for Agricultural Calamities,
steadily declining. which provides protection for standing crops and live-
stock against frost, flooding, land slippage, storms, hur-
ricanes, avalanches, droughts, atypical rains, epizootic
France diseases, and other risks. Coverage is provided only to
property situated in continental France. It does not cover
In France national solidarity in confronting catastro- agricultural assets, such as machinery and buildings,
phes is explicitly expressed in the preamble to the that can be insured with private insurance. The fund's
1946 Constitution, which states, "The State affirms the income comes from a parafiscal rate applied to the pre-
solidarity and equality of all its citizens in facing the miums generated by the basic insurance policies plus
burdens that result from national calamities." a state subsidy Insurance companies underwrite basic
The Caisse Centrale de Reassurances (CCR) was estab- policies, adjust losses, and effect payments, but no
lished in 1946 as a public entity of commercial nature. premiums are paid to them.
In 1993 CCR became a stock company wholly owned
by the state. It functions as a reinsurer, providing cata-
strophe reinsurance to local insurers, backed by an unlim- Japan
ited guarantee from the state for catastrophic risks affecting
property located on French territory The state determines Although Japan is exposed to many types of catastroph-
the premium rates, franchises, and amounts to be rein- ic events-including earthquakes, typhoons, floods, and
sured. It is also responsible for declaring a natural cata- volcanic eruptions-state involvement is limited to insur-
strophe state of emergency and for developing and ing dwellings against the risk of earthquakes. Risks in
implementing risk prevention measures. Japan are insured by private insurers; local reinsurers;
The natural catastrophe guarantee is provided auto- the Japanese Earthquake Reinsurance Co. (JERCO), which
matically to all property insurance policies purchased is partially state owned; and the government, as a rein-
in France on which an extra premium for catastrophe surer of last resort with limited capacity. The system has
coverage is charged. Collection of these extra premi- not proven effective (as the response to the Kobe earth-
ums, evaluation and adjustment of claims, and pay- quake showed), and penetration of coverage (which is
ments to policyholders are handled by private insurance voluntary) is low.
companies. A uniform rate-ranging from 6 percent for
motor vehicle coverage to 9 percent for property and
loss of profit coverage-is used throughout the coun- New Zealand
try Application of a single rate, regardless of the level
of exposure to risk, has been challenged, but the gov- The Earthquake Commission of New Zealand operates
ernment has successfully defended its policy, invoking much like the Consorcio of Spain. Its name notwith-
the solidarity principle. standing, it offers coverage for a variety of catastrophic
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risks. The state provides unlimited capacity whenever which has yet to be approved by Congress, seeks to mit-
direct insurance reserves and reinsurance are exhaust- igate losses in zones with high catastrophic exposure
ed. Coverage is available for family dwellings (includ- by establishing more rigorous building standards, cre-
ing small businesses), personal property (excluding ating a federal catastrophe fund, and increasing rein-
automobiles and works of art), and the land on which surance capacity in order to increase coverage. All of
dwellings are situated. Commercial and industrial prop- these actions would be implemented and controlled
erty is insured by private insurance, following with- by FEMA.
drawal of the government from this sector. Some states have also tried to deal with risk. In 1986
the California legislature passed a law requiring every
insurer selling homeowners insurance to offer earthquake
United States coverage. In 1991 the California Earthquake Recovery
Fund was established to provide protection to home-
The United States has probably the highest catastrophe owners. The program failed, however, because of high
risk exposure in the world, in terms of both frequency loss ratios. After the Northridge earthquake in 1994,
and severity For various reasons (low penetration of insurers refused to provide coverage. In 1996 a set of laws
insurance, inadequate capacity of private insurers, was passed by the California legislature authorizing the
laws that impede the creation of catastrophe reserves, formation of a new state agency, the Calif ornia Earth-
high expected losses), the federal government pro- quake Authority That agency provides a limited form of
vides catastrophic flood insurance. The National Flood earthquake insurance to homeowners, renters, and con-
Insurance Program has been in operation since 1968 dominium owners. Seventy-two percent of insurers par-
and has had mixed results. ticipate in the fund. Financing is done by layers of funding
Earthquakes in the United States have the poten- (reserves) and reinsurance. Financial performance has
tial to cause enormous damage. Since 1964 (follow- been worse than expected, because of high premium
ing the Anchorage earthquake), a number of proposals rates, low coverage, and the high cost of re nsurance.
have been made hy governmental and private bodies In the wake of the enormous damage caused by Hur-
on how to deal with the high level of risk posed by ricane Andrew (which caused 10 Florida insurers to
earthquakes. Failing to come up with an insurance declare bankruptcy), the State of Florida established the
solution, Congress passed the National Earthquake State Hurricane Trust Fund in 1994. The fund acts as
Hazards Reduction Act of 1977, which mandated the a reinsurer, absorbing 75 percent of the excess of loss-
creation of a prevention and mitigation program to es incurred by insurance companies caused by hurri-
be applied by the Federal Emergency Management canes if those losses reach twice the premium volume
Agency (FEMA). collected by the insurer for that risk. The objective is
In 1987 a group of insurance companies established to maintain coverage at accessible levels, especially for
the Earthquake Project (later known as the Natural Dis- homeowners. The State of Hawaii established a similar
aster Coalition and the Project for the Law for Protec- fund, the Hurricane Relief Fund of Hawaii, following
tion and Prevention of Natural Disasters). The project, Hurricane Iniki.
Annex 4
List of People Interviewed for Study
and Participants in Workshop
Office of the President Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources,
and Fisheries
Dr. Carlos Hurtado Lopez, Coordinator of Advisers for
Economic and Social Policy Dr. Juan Carlos Belausteguigoitia, Under-Minister of
Planning and Integration
Ministry of Finance and Public Credit Lic. Carlos Camacho Gaos, Under-Minister of Fisheries
Dr. Carlos Garcia Moreno, Director General of Public Lic. Mario Guillermo Huacuja, Director General of Pub-
Credit lic Communication
Lic. Ricardo Ochoa, Director of International Finance Ing. Sergio Varela Hernandez, Director, Under-Ministry
Institutions of Natural Resources, Unit of National Inventory of
Natural Resources
Lic. Jose Antonio Alvarado, Chief of Policy and Budget
Control Unit Ing. Roberto Martinez Dominguez, Under-Director of
Forest Fires, Under-Ministry of Natural Resources
Lic. Evelyne Rodriguez Ortega, Director General of Pro-
gramming and Budget for Farming, Supply, Social Devel- Lic. Hugo Contreras, Chief of Staff, Under-Ministry of
opment and Natural Resources Planning
Lic. Claudia Grayeb, Adviser, International Finance Lic. Mireya Vilar Compte, Adviser, Under-Ministry
Institutions of Planning
Lic. Lorenza Arnal, Director, Economic Analysis and Lic. Sara Avila, Adviser, Under-Ministry of Planning
Project Appraisal
Lic. Rodolfo Villarreal Rios, Director of Fishing Licens-
Lic. Maria Carina Navarro, Adviser, Unit of Budget ing and Concessions, General Directorate of Fisheries
Control Administration, Under-Ministry of Fisheries
Lic. Jose Federico Arroyo Paredes, Director of Organi-
zation, General Directorate of Fisheries Administration,
Under-Ministry of Fisheries
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Ministry of the Interior, General Directorate National Insurance and Securities Commission
of Civil Protection
Lic. Manuel Aguilera Verduzco, President
Lic. Manuel Diaz Infante, Director General
Ing. Armando Venegas Padilla, Director General of Rein-
Lic. Francisco Rodriguez Acosta, Administrative surance Supervision
Director
Lic. Francisco Lbpez Jacintez, Director of Sectoral National Bank for Public Services and NVorks
Arrangements (BANOBRAS)
Lic. Edmundo Cordero HernAndez, Coordinator of Lic. Jose Luis Flores Hernandez, Director General
DGPC-CENAPRED Link
Lic. Alejandro Peralta
Ministry of the Interior, National Center for Dis-
aster Prevention (CENAPRED) National Autonomous University of Mexico, Engi-
neering Institute
Dr. Roberto Meli, Director General
Dr. Luis Esteva Maraboto, Researcher Emeritus
Dr. Sergio M. Alcocer, Chief of Structural and Geo-
technical Engineering Dr. Mario G. Ordaz Schroeder, Researcher
Dr. M. en C. Carlos A. Gutierrez Martinez, Chief of Geo-
logical Risks National Banking and Stock Exchange
Commission
Dr. Servando de la Cruz Reyna, Research Coordinator
Lic. Javier Gavito, Director General
Lic. Carmen Pimentel Amador, Under-Director for Inter-
national Affairs Lic. Salvi Folch Viadero, Vice President of Stock Exchange
Supervision
Ministry of Public Education Act. Gabriel Ramirez Femnadez, Special Projects Director
Lic. Rodolfo Igarreta Coen, Director of School-Related Lic. Alfonso Covarrubias Martinez, Director General
Emergencies of Broadcasters
Ministry of Urban Development and Housing for Ministry of Agriculture, Cattle, and Rural Devel-
the Federal District opment, Trust for Shared Risk
Arq. Roberto Eibenschutz Hartman, Minister of Urban Ing. Juan Manuel Contijoch Escontria, Director
Development and Housing General
Lic. Luis Preciado Barragan, Special Assistant
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National Water Commission United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
Ing. Daniel Ruiz, Assistant Director General Lic. Rafael Rodriguez Capetillo, Chief of Environmen-
tal Evaluations
Federal Electricity Commission
Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)
Lic. Favio 0. Tellez Romero, Director Risk
Management Dr. Jose Luis Cervallos
Lic. Leonardo Rozenstein S., Technical Area
Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico
(ITAM)
Agroasemex
Ing. Juan Ignacio Gil Ant6n
C.P Raul Sanchez, Director General
Alianza Reinsurance, S.A.
Afore Bancomer
Act. Jose Angel Luelmo, Director General
Lic. Ralf Peters Castilla, Director General
Act. Rosa Maria Morales Rojas, Executive Director
Mexican Social Security Institute Lic. Guillermo Rodriguez Ledezma
Lic. Genaro Borrego Estrada, Director General
Gerling Insurance of Mexico, S.A.
Lic. Rolando Razo Ramirez, Chief of Unit, Institu-
tional Risk Administration C.P Aristeo Sanchez Castafteda, Under-Director of
Administration and Finance
Mexican Petroleum (PEMEX) Ing. Ricardo Mendoza Avila, Under-Director for Fire
and Other Risks
Lic. Manuel Matamoros Franco, Manager, Risk
Management
Mexican Association of Insurance Institutions
(AMIS)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Lic. Arturo de la Cruz Canales, Technical Management
Mr. Bruno Guandalini, Resident Representative
Ing. Alberto Villagran Davila, Damages Technical
Ms. Laura L6pez, Program Officer Director
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Comercial America Insurance Provincial National Group Insurance
Act. Ma. del Pilar Fernandez de S., UJnder-Director Lic. Carlos Molinar, Senior Vice President
Reinsurance Losses
Lic. Juan Segura, Presidente, Corporate Sales
Act. Miguel Angel Martinez Medina, Executive
Director Brokers Act. Octavio Careaga Gutierrez, Reinsurarice Director
Ing. Rene Norefia Zermefio, Technical Director Lic. Enrique Kloss Rosales, Technical Director Losses
Patria Reinsurance Swiss Re Mexico
Lic. J. Adrian Chavez Cordoba, Manager Lic. Max Scagnetti Roel, Director General
Lic. Roberto PedrazaJimenez, Director Ing. Jose Agustin Rodriguez, Technical Unler-Director
Lic. C.P Jose Padilla, Delegate Counsel Ing. Miguel Angel Camarillo, Manager, Farming Sales
Aon Group Limited of Mexico Munich Re Mexico
Lic. Luis Martinez de la Fuente, Director General Lic. Agustin Gutierrez Aja, Director General
Ing. Benito Juarez Moran, Director Special Risks Lic. Karl-Heinz Reichlmair, Marketing Director
Aon Risk Services Mancera, S.C. Ernst and Young
Lic. Carlos 0. Ramos G., President Lic. Esteban Ailloud Pe6n del ValleMapfre Reinsurance
Company, S.A.
Lic. Bernard P Baudouin, Executive Vice President
Ing. Andres E. Fernandez Aviles, Director General
Lic. Richard H. Atherton, Vice President and Manager,
Global Business Unit
In addition, the following individuals participated
Ing. Roberto Avila Morales, Under-Director of Risk in the workshop:
Administration
World Bank
Aon Group Limited (Miami, Florida)
Alcira Kreimer, Manager, Disaster Management Facility
Mr. Keith Goymer, LLB, Director
Margaret Arnold, Program Officer, Disaster Manage-
ment Facility
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Christopher Barham, Senior Operations Officer, Latin Consultants
America and the Caribbean Region, Environmentally
and Socially Sustainable Development Unit Lic. Daniel Bitran Bitran
Adolfo Brizzi, Agriculture and Environment Sector Lic. Luis Enrique Gutierrez Alcaraz
Leader, Mexico Country Management Unit
Ing. Ricardo Toledo L.
Paul Freeman, Consultant, Disaster Management Facility
Frederick Krimgold, Consultant, Disaster Manage- Impact Forecasting
ment Facility
David Odeh, Vice President
Rodney Lester, Senior Financial Specialist, Financial
Sector Development Department Tom David, Director
Francisco Javier Perez, Senior Engineer
International Finance Corporation
Tom Vogt, Senior Insurance Officer
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